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The failure of transitional justice (TJ) processes in most post-Arab Spring countries has called 
TJ theory into question. Most literature addressing this failure is based, primarily, on arguments 
of anti-Westernism and the “external” nature of TJ measures. Two main TJ characteristics are 
viewed as problematic regarding post-Arab Spring states: its liberal paradigm and its top-down, 
state-centric focus. Transformative justice (TfJ) which is a bottom-up socio-cultural theory was 
developed to overcome these dilemmas.  
This thesis uses TfJ theory in developing research questions and hypotheses. Unlike most of 
the literature, which is based on qualitative methods, this thesis uses a quantitative experimental 
opinion poll survey, distributed in Libya, Yemen and Jordan, in order to examine whether using 
local religious language and implementing bodies gathers more local legitimacy for TJ’s 
pillars.  
The thesis found that, despite high mistrust in the UN, people nevertheless believe that it is 
more capable of enforcing TJ decisions than rijal-al-islah, indicating that the UN should still be 
viewed as an important player in the Arab TJ process. This thesis found limited support that the 
use of local religious language leads to more acceptance of TJ outcomes than the use of 
international language, but that this depends on the case.  
This thesis suggests an important recommendation to the UN and TJ scholars: it is worthwhile 
to conduct further research on the possibilities of cooperation between the UN and local 
religious actors to achieve better TJ results in Arab countries. 
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  1.1 Introduction  
The eruption of revolutions against authoritarian regimes in several MENA region 
countries in 2011, in what was called “the Arab Spring”, called transitional justice theory into 
question. The international community has a prepared formula for addressing post-conflict 
situations through the process of transitional justice. According to the International Center for 
Transitional Justice (ICTJ), Transitional Justice (TJ) is “a set of approaches which societies 
undertake to address past human rights violations, including severe abuses such as; mass atrocity, 
civil war, or genocide, in order to build peace and democracy and find durable solutions to the 
conflict to ensure its non-recurrence” (ICTJ, 2005:1). Although the approach varies depending on 
different contexts, there is a global agreement on four pillars: criminal justice, reparations, truth-
seeking, and institutional reform. In most cases involving the Arab Spring where the international 
community tried to apply these four pillars, the results were disastrous, as countries moved toward 
more unrest, new authoritarianism, or civil wars. Libya, Yemen, Syria, and Egypt are examples of 
this.  
 Several criticisms are raised against the pre-packaged international formula throughout the 
scholarly literature on TJ. One main dilemma of TJ is its liberal paradigm which is based on two 
principles: top-down processes and a focus on civil and political rights. This makes positive results 
difficult to achieve in different world cultures and contexts (explained in more detail below). 
Another dilemma is that TJ is usually imposed by foreign actors, such as the United Nations (UN) 
or agencies authorized by UN member states. Thus, TJ is expected to be often faced with 
opposition and negative reactions from local societies due in-part to historical colonial memories, 
as was the case in many MENA and African countries.  
When it comes to literature related to the Arab Spring countries and TJ, only few studies 
deal with these dilemmas and the failure of TJ processes in these countries. The studies are mainly 
qualitative, concentrate on political factors, and are built on previous assumptions of anti-western 
sentiment in Arab countries. Little scholarship could be found on local socio-cultural phenomena 




1.2 Aim and Research Question:  
This research aims at filling the afore-mentioned gap in TJ literature through an original 
inferential quantitative survey on people from three countries, Libya, Yemen, and Jordan. This is 
done in order to study whether addressing the local population of MENA countries in a way that 
is sensitive to local culture and Islam can promote more acceptance of transitional justice outcomes 
than approaches that rely on foreign terms and concepts. It also examines whether or not TJ 
outcomes may be viewed as more legitimate by the affected population when they are implemented 
by local religious actors, rather than international ones.  
The study is based on transformative justice theory, which argues that consideration of 
culture and religion when applying TJ and allowing locals to implement TJ processes leads to more 
positive results. This study is also based on previous literature, which argues that: addressing local 
populations in a way that is sensitive to their culture (Islam in the case of Arab Muslim countries) 
can contribute to more legitimacy; and that TJ should be localized by providing successful 
examples of local implementation in some countries, such as Rwanda. It is worth to mention that 
by legitimacy, it is meant “a psychological property of an authority, institution, or social 
arrangement that leads those connected to it to believe that it is appropriate, proper, and just” 
(Tyler, 2006:375). Two types of legitimacy are of concern to this thesis, legitimacy of the actor, 
i.e. people find the implementor as “proper and just” to decide or implement certain decisions, and 
procedural legitimacy which argues that legitimacy for certain decisions is derived from the 
process of how it was decided and justified (Tyler and Sunshine, 2003; Brownsword and Goodwin, 
2012). In the case of this thesis, procedural legitimacy could be linked to the source of the decision 
(sharia law or international law) and the process and rhetoric that follows based one either one of 
the two sources.  
In general, the outcomes of this research are expected to contribute to the current 
understanding of how TJ could be applied in the unique situation of the MENA region.  
The primary research question of this study is:  
Can local culture and Islam promote more acceptance of transitional justice outcomes in post 
Arab Spring countries than using foreign/international terms and concepts of transitional 





The sub-research questions are:  
Do local religious actors have more legitimacy than international actors to implement transitional 
justice in post Arab Spring countries?  
Does using religion lead to more legitimacy than international laws and standards in post Arab 
Spring countries?  
Does religion have more impact in unstable states than stable ones?  
 
 1.3 Delimitations  
This study is limited to the study of socio-cultural factors and how TJ could benefit from a 
socio-cultural, bottom-up perspective. The study will not cover the role of several other local 
factors, such as Islamism in political life, as this is primarily studied through applying concepts 
such as “Liberal Islam” or “Political Islam” which are outside of the scope of this thesis.  
Moreover, while this project acknowledges the importance of an economic perspective 
when studying transformative justice and the effect of economy on the success of TJ in post Arab 
spring countries, such a topic is too broad for this thesis to properly cover. However, a brief 
overview of the economic perspective will be made in the literature review. A more holistic 
examination of how a country could move from conflict or post-conflict situation to peace could 
be achieved through a triangulation of three vectors of analysis: the political top-down process of 
transitional justice, the socio-cultural bottom-up process, and the process of economic reformation. 
This research is necessarily limited, due to time and size constraints, to the socio-cultural and 
bottom-up process angle.  
1.4 Outline of Study  
This thesis is organized in six main chapters. Chapter one introduces the topic and the aim 
of study, as well as the research questions. Chapter two explains the theoretical framework and 
elaborates on the most important concepts that will be used throughout this thesis. Chapter three 
reviews previous literature on transitional justice in post Arab Spring countries and builds thesis 
hypotheses through reviewing three aspects that affect TJ implementation in MENA region 
countries, according to the literature. It also underscores the hypotheses which will be tested in 




Chapter five presents the results of the quantitative survey and describes the collected data. Chapter 
six discusses the results and highlights the most relevant observations of the study in light of the 
hypotheses and research questions. It also concludes the thesis, provides recommendation, and 
suggests directions for future research.  
2. Theoretical Framework  
This chapter elaborates on the two main theories upon which this thesis is based. 
Transitional Justice and Transformative Justice.   
2.1 Transitional Justice (TJ)  
Transitional justice (TJ) is a concept which was introduced in the mid-1980s to deal with 
severe human rights violations during regime changes in the countries of Latin America 
(Arenhövel, 2008:571). Theoretically, there is a lack of consensus over what TJ should include or 
what it means. Buckley-Zistel et al. (2014) in their book Theorizing Transitional Justice identified 
the problem of under-theorization of transitional justice in the current literature. They have 
identified several approaches of how transitional justice theory could be defined. For the purpose 
of this thesis, I will use the definitions which were provided by the United Nations and by the 
ICTJ, as follows:  
TJ is: “ The full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts 
to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve 
justice and achieve reconciliation”(UN, 2004:3), to help the society deal with “severe abuses such 
as mass atrocity, civil war, or genocide, in order to build peace and democracy and find durable 
solutions to the conflict to ensure its non-recurrence” (ICTJ, 2005:1).  
In practice, TJ processes consist of four pillars, which are widely agreed upon. These are: 
criminal justice, reparation, truth-seeking mechanisms, and institutional reform (SIDA, 2019). In 
the following section, I will provide a short explanation of each pillar:  
a. Criminal Justice:  
An important pillar for ensuring non-reoccurrence of previous heinous crimes by holding 
perpetrators of the most serious crimes accountable (SIDA, 2019). Criminal prosecution also plays 




that criminal TJ cannot prosecute every violation or every person having committed a crime. 
Rather, it concentrates on crimes that are the most symbolic, and those by which people are most 
affected. The criminal justice pillar also aims to prosecute the most responsible perpetrators 
(SIDA, 2019).  
In general, under TJ, these criminal prosecutions should be practiced on a national level, 
using domestic legal frameworks and institutions. However, in certain cases where countries that 
are coming out of severe conflicts lack the necessary institutions, suffer chronic issues of impunity, 
or are otherwise unwilling to conduct such prosecutions, the international community intervenes 
in different ways: (1) through creating special tribunals at the international level (such as Criminal 
Tribunal for Yugoslavia (1993) and Rwanda (1995)); (2) establishing hybrid courts which combine 
national and international instruments, such as in the cases of Sierra Leone, Kosovo, Iraq and 
Lebanon; (3) or by referring the cases to the only permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) 
which deals with war crimes, crimes against humanity, and cases of genocide (Andrieu, 2010).  
b. Reparation:  
Reparation is a form of social justice aimed at compensating and restoring victims’ dignity 
(Andrieu, 2010). The compensation may be physical or psychological, or a mix of both (SIDA, 
2019). Physical compensation could take the form of money or free services, while psychological 
reparations includes official apologies, building memorials, or naming streets after victims 
(Andrieu, 2010).  
c. Truth-Seeking Mechanisms:  
As the name indicates, truth-seeking mechanisms aim at ensuring that true narratives are 
adopted and that survivors and victims can access true information and facts, such as the 
whereabouts of their loved-ones and what they have endured (SIDA, 2019). This can be achieved 
through several means, such as truth commissions, fact-finding missions, documentation by non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), etc. (SIDA, 2019). This mechanism is vital in satisfying the 
victims through acknowledgment of their unjustified suffering.  




This is a vital pillar to ensure that transitional governments can work properly to address 
past violations and ensure non-recurrence. Any state transitioning from authoritarianism to 
democracy must replace the repressive institutions, which facilitated the original conflict and 
oppression, with new democratic institutions, especially on the judicial and security levels (UN, 
2010). One step to achieving this reform is vetting, i.e. preventing officials who played a role in 
oppression in the previous regime from holding office or running for positions in the new 
institutions (UN, 2010).  
It is worth mentioning that TJ is not limited to these four pillars. Other measures can be 
considered part of the process, such as official guarantees of non-recurrence (SIDA, 2019), support 
of women’s rights, and creation of national consultations to ensure engagement of the public in 
the TJ process (SIDA, 2019). For the purposes of this study, I will concentrate only on processes 
and pillars which relate directly to dealing with victims, satisfying their needs, and rectifying the 
conflict within society. These include criminal justice, reparation, truth-seeking mechanisms, 
national consultation, and other practices that are related to achieving the above goals.  
2.1.1 Current top-down dilemma of TJ.  
Several scholars have identified the liberal background and approach of TJ as a key 
limitation of it. For instance, Gready and Robins (2014) work, which was cited about 247 times 
by TJ academics, is one of the main articles in terms of criticizing current transitional justice 
concept and suggesting a new paradigm for TJ by applying transformative justice instead 
(discussed further below). In their article, Gready and Robins argued that TJ is a liberal product of 
globalization. According to them, TJ in its current form is based on two fundamental principles: 
Firstly, it gives civil and political rights a priority over economic and social rights. In other words, 
TJ is “prioritizing the creation of institutions over a contextualized engagement with the welfare 
of the population” (Gready and Robins, 2014:341). Secondly, it leans toward interventions based 
on the neo-liberal economic system that draws from the “Washington Consensus”1 which is 
 
1 Washington Consensus: A concept that was firstly mentioned by John Williamson (1990) to represent a set of ten 
propositions that were widely agreed upon by Washington based international economic institutions, such as 
International Monitory Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, in order to reform the economic situation in Latin 
American countries as of 1989 (Williamson,2000:251). Later, the concept became used to represent a reform 





“market driven”. This might be faced with deep-seated resistance in illiberal countries, as was the 
case in Iraq and Afghanistan (Gready and Robins, 2014).  
Gready and Robins argued that this ignorance of economic, social and cultural aspects of 
the society hinders any actual change in the country, and “creates ‘empty’ institutions paralyzed 
by a lack of capacity rather than responding to the everyday needs of the new state’s citizens” 
(p.341). This is so because according to the two authors, the welfare of the population and their 
social and cultural rights are important aspects for the international community to consider in 
addressing the roots of any conflict. 
Moreover, Gready and Robins viewed TJ as a top-down and “state-centric” mechanism 
which does not allow much engagement from the public society, and from the victims who are the 
most affected by the conflict. Additionally, the two authors argued that current TJ is working on 
building states and institutions with the final goal of achieving a liberal democracy, without giving 
much concentration to the local culture, or integrating local society into the new mechanisms.  
A similar concern was raised by Kora Andrieu, who argued that liberal TJ views any 
conflict as being of a political nature, while ignoring the possible economic, social or structural 
influences (Andrieu, 2010). She holds that almost no conflict can be successfully quelled without 
incorporating economic, social and cultural rights into the transitional process.  
2.2. Transformative Justice (TfJ)  
In broad terms, transformative justice (TfJ) is an approach that was created to respond to 
cases of violence, abuse or harm among societies and communities without the interference of the 
state, without creating more violence, and through applying principles of accountability, resilience, 
healing and safety (Mingus, 2018). This approach has been practiced by default within 
marginalized groups, migrants, illegal migrants, or indigenous communities who seek to protect 
themselves and solve their problems without the involvement of the state, which they often identify 
as a creator of more harm than good (Mingus, 2018).  
In academia, the term “transformative justice” is undertheorized, and there is disagreement 
on what this term should mean, and what relation it should have with TJ (Evans, 2018). Several 
scholars have attempted to address these problems. For example, Matthew Evans (2018) has 




instruments. He has noted that unlike TJ, which only deals with short-term violations of civil and 
political rights, TfJ can be applied to deal with socio-economic violations and structural violence. 
Evans (2013) underscores that: 
Transformative justice seeks to contribute to the wider transformation of post-conflict and 
post-authoritarian societies beyond the cessation or addressing of widespread interpersonal 
violence and violation of ‘bodily integrity’ rights. Crucial to this ‘transformative’ agenda 
focuses upon socio-economic structures, the ways in which inequalities may produce 
structural violence, and how this structural violence may effectively be addressed (p.8).  
In her text, Lambourne (2014) tried to put a definition to TfJ through combining TJ with 
peacebuilding. She argued that TfJ should include “political, economic and psychosocial as well 
as legal dimensions” (p.22). Lambourne identified four elements of TfJ, which overlap with, but 
also develop, the four pillars of TJ. These are: (1) legal justice, which is close to the criminal justice 
pillar in TJ, (2) truth, knowledge and acknowledgements which is similar to truth seeking 
mechanisms of TJ, (3) socioeconomic justice which expands on reparations to include all financial 
and material compensations, and (4) political justice, which is related to “the ability to provide 
basic services”, eliminating corruption, and achieving good governance and strong leadership 
(p.31).  
Beside the concentration on socio-economic rights, scholars have argued for the 
importance of social and cultural rights in the process and the outcome of TfJ. To illustrate, 
Lambourne asserted that respect for, and proper consideration of local traditions, cultures and 
rituals, is a key aspect which differentiates TFJ from the typical, more liberal TJ (Lambourne, 
2014). More specifically, she placed emphasis on the idea that TFJ should be applied from a 
bottom-up, rather than a top-down perspective, the latter of which is prevalent in current TJ 
practices. Sandoval (2017) similarly explained that TfJ should be “a bottom up approach to 
addressing violations and providing redress, one that is not state-centered and that is driven by 
victims and for victims” (p.13).  
According to Gready and Robins (2014), “transformative justice is not the result of a top-
down imposition of external legal frameworks or institutional templates, but of a more bottom-up 




and victims participate in the process while benefiting from their local culture, traditions, religion 
and rituals (Lambourne, 2014; Sandoval, 2017).  
This thesis makes use of the expansions and amendments which TfJ theory has 
incorporated, in order to overcome the problems of the common TJ theory. In particular, this study 
will benefit from the following two aspects of implementing successful TJ: 1) making the process 
bottom-up rather than top-down, and 2) incorporating and benefiting from local cultures, 
traditions, religions and rituals.  
3. Literature Review  
Before the beginning of the Arab Spring, there was limited concentration on the MENA 
region in TJ literature (Abouldahab, 2017a). However, the problems occurring in every Arab 
Spring country after the dismantling of the former regimes have called into question the current 
understanding of TJ, and raised new concerns that captured scholars’ interest. Hence, several 
relevant studies were conducted in this field during the last 9 years, which are reviewed below.  
3.1 TJ and the Arab Spring  
3.1.1 Challenges to TJ introduced by the Arab Spring  
In the TJ and Arab Spring literature, there are five major issues that have been identified 
as problematic in the application of TJ in the MENA region. This section focuses on explaining 
each of these five issues as it pertains to this thesis.  
The first problem is the tension between the concept of TJ itself as a liberal product2, and 
the illiberal socio-political bodies that are playing an influential role in the MENA region. In their 
book, Fisher and Stewart (2014) argued that Islamist actors of the MENA region are posing a threat 
and challenge to the liberal transitional justice norms. Nassar (2014), Khatib (2014) and Salloukh 
(2014) contributed three chapters to the book to address this tension between Islamists and TJ. 
Among the points which were raised in this regard is Islamists’ ideas and discourse regarding 
issues such as equal gender rights, freedom of religion, and separation of state from religion. In all 
 
2 liberal paradigm of transitional justice means that it is a top-down process that concentrates only on 
political and civil rights, while ignoring the local differences between different communities and the 





these issues, Islamic parties in most Arab countries hold views contradictory to the international 
standards, thus preventing full liberal TJ from being achieved (Khatib, 2014).  
However, as Abouldahab (2015) underscores in her review of the book, none of the authors 
reflected on the challenges imposed by military actors in Egypt for instance, or the secular 
authoritarian regimes of Syria or Bahrain, on the TJ process. She posits that the tension is between 
authoritarianism and TJ, not Islam and TJ. She has also supported this argument by recalling the 
example of Tunisia, where the Islamic parties played an important role in promoting the process 
of TJ in the country (Abouldahab, 2015). In her book, Abouldahab (2017a) argues against the idea 
that TJ should follow a linear path from illiberal violent authoritarian regimes to liberal democracy. 
Rather, she maintains that there is a need to develop and update the current theories of TJ, so that 
they fit illiberal transitions (Abouldahab, 2017a). However, she did not provide a clear explanation 
of how this could be achieved. Further discussion of this tension between Islam and TJ will be 
explained in more details later in the chapter3.  
The second issue raised concerning TJ in the MENA region is the public demand for socio-
economic accountability in addition to civil and political accountability — an issue addressed by 
the TfJ theory. Typically, TJ is preoccupied with providing justice for victims of massive human 
rights abuses and massacres. Meanwhile, little attention is given to the economic violations 
(Mistry, 2012). However, because of the deeply-rooted and systematic socio-economic crimes, 
such as corruption, money-laundry, and theft, brought about by decades of dictatorship regimes, 
calls have been made for a stronger emphasis on socio-economic justice (Mistry, 2012). In other 
words, former regimes should also be held accountable for their socio-economic abuses.  
In this regard, Sriram (2017) supported those calls, claiming that justice will otherwise be 
incomplete and may even fail, if it is ineffective in responding to the demands of people by closing 
the socio-economic accountability gap in current TJ theory (Sriram, 2017). Mistry (2012) has also 
emphasized this point in his article, however with an element of caution. According to him, TJ 
must ensure that corruption is not taking place in the judiciary and prosecution bodies which will 
enforce this accountability. Since corruption is often endemic, it might be difficult to ensure that 
 




new TJ mechanisms implemented in the country are free from socio-economic violations 
themselves.  
 Abouldahab (2017a) has warned of another problem that occurred in the Arab countries 
when socio-economic justice was introduced. This is the problem of using this form of 
accountability as a mask to cover the severe human rights violations and crimes against humanity 
that might have been committed by the prosecuted dictators. By reflecting upon the cases of Egypt 
and Tunisia, where dictators were mainly prosecuted for economic crimes, massively ignoring the 
other severe human rights abuses, Abouldahab (2017a) emphasized the importance of human 
rights and political justice before socio-economic ones. It is important to clarify that Abouldahab 
is not arguing against socio-economic justice — a form of justice she stressed as important in her 
article “Transitional Justice Theory in Authoritarian Contexts: The Case of Egypt” (Abouldahab, 
2017b). Rather, she is warning that there is a possibility of misuse of socio-economic 
accountability as a misdirection away from crucial human rights violations committed by the 
prosecuted regimes.  
The third tension concerns the role of the international community in TJ. Although the 
international community and international human rights standards were welcomed and played a 
positive role in many previous cases of TJ, such as in Latin America (Abouladahab, 2017a:6), the 
case is more complicated for Arab countries. This issue, however, will be covered in detail under 
the “anti-western sentiment” subheading further down.  
Another important challenge facing TJ is selective justice at the national level. According 
to Showaia (2014) selective justice “aims to achieve justice for a particular layer of society or 
serves a particular agenda of a group of people, instead of the whole of society” (p.68). Selective 
justice has been used by several transitional governments in order to absorb public anger while 
negating opportunities for real justice. In this regard, O’Lughlin (2013) highlighted that in Bahrain, 
the government adopted some TJ measures, such as certain prosecutions and establishment of truth 
commissions, but it did so with the aim of stopping real justice from occurring. An illustration of 
this is that in the wake of protests in Bahrain in February 2011 calling for democratic modifications 
in the country (and later for overthrowing the ruling family), the government of Bahrain appeared 
somewhat responsive to pressure from protests and the international community. The most 




which served as a truth commission to investigate any violations during the protests period. This 
step was viewed as positive action toward achieving TJ in the country, and eased tensions 
surrounding the ruling family. However, although the Commission submitted a 500 pages report, 
almost none of its recommendations were fully implemented. No accountability or justice was 
achieved for victims, as only ten junior police officers were brought to trial. All in all, the country 
seemed to be fighting “TJ with TJ” in order to calm dissent and outrage (O’Lughlin,2013:2). 
The final challenge that has been raised in the recent Arab Spring and TJ literature is the 
absence of existing democratic structure. In other words, countries which are stepping out from 
decades of authoritarian regimes have either authoritarian institutions, or at least weak institutions, 
making the implementation of justice through these institutions nearly impossible (Kersten, 2014). 
Abouldahab highlighted this, criticizing TJ theory for assuming that democratic institutions are 
already existing (2017 a, b). However, from the perspective of this current study it is important to 
recall that institutional reform is included in the four pillars of TJ theory. Therefore, as was stated 
by Mistry (2012), the issue is “timing and sequencing”. To clarify, since democratic institutions 
do not usually exist in the countries in question, analysis of the time needed for re-establishing 
functioning institutions, and which steps should be taken first, is vital.  
 3.1.2 Gaps in the Current Suggested Guidelines to Make TJ Work in the MENA Region:  
The literature review above identifies five possible solutions for successful TJ processes in 
the MENA region. These solutions are summed up in this section with identification of some 
important existing research gaps and points meriting deeper reflection for the purposes of this 
thesis.   
Firstly, several authors indicated the need to update the traditional liberal TJ theoretical 
model (see: Abouldahab, 2017a; Fisher and Stewart, 2014). However, neither book provides 
specific guidelines on how this should be done in practice, or in which terms the theory should be 
modified. This is an important gap in the current literature of TJ and the Arab Spring.  
Secondly, Mistry (2012) addressed a vital problem facing TJ in the Arab countries, which 
is the issue of “ready templates” or “pre-prepared recipes” of TJ. He argued that there is a problem 
with the international community introducing TJ as a strict template that the nations must follow 
(Mistry, 2012). This is what leads TJ to fail in many countries, as there is no one- size- fits- all 




“consultation and attention” before applying any TJ tool. In other words, the international 
community and transition actors must consult with each other, and with the people, in order to 
design the best working transitional process (Mistry, 2012). However, he did not provide a clear 
vision of how the people could be represented and their real views and local cultures considered, 
separate from political and top-down considerations.  
Thirdly, from studying the role of new constitution in Egypt, Turner (2015) argued for the 
vital role of a “transitional constitution” in order to bring peace and facilitate collective agreement 
between all conflicting parties (Turner, 2015). He argued that the different parties need to agree 
on a guide that will help guide them through the transitional period successfully. Moreover, writing 
a constitution at the early stages of transition builds trust between the people and the leadership, 
as the people will decide the future steps of TJ by voting for or against the new constitution. 
However, building on Mistry’s argument that there is no one-size-fits-all solution, Turner argued 
that during the constitution’s drafting, all involved parties must consider three factors: ideology, 
culture, and religion of the state in question. Moreover, he argued that although the country in 
transition can make use of international treaties and agreements in writing its constitution, each 
country has its own characteristics and needs, thus the international tools must not be incorporated 
wholesale into the transitional constitution (Turner, 2015). Abouldahab has also reflected on the 
importance of rewriting the laws and deleting any oppressive or discriminatory laws as a step 
toward successful TJ (Abouldahab, 2017a). However, two previously discussed problems with this 
suggestion are the “timing” and the functionality of institutions. That is to say, Turner was calling 
for a transitional constitution at the early stages of the transition, however, it is common for 
institutions to be weak or authoritarian at the beginning of any transitional period. This was the 
case of Egypt — which Turner submitted as a successful case to exemplify his argument — where 
the timing and the facts on the ground proved insufficient in representing the wants and needs of 
the people. Therefore, it is important to guarantee that the formation of a constitution is not 
misused, or used to manipulate the people, while no real accountability or transition for justice was 
achieved, as was also the case in Bahrain.  
Fourthly, a successful TJ process should contribute to developing the country and building 
its economy while simultaneously bringing about civil and political justice. Development aids in 




achieving social justice. All these factors are important for stabilizing the country and supporting 
human rights (Turner 2015; Abouldahab 2017a, b).  
Finally, many scholars insisted on the important role of civil society. The Arab Spring, 
which toppled strong dictators, relied greatly on the role of civil society in raising awareness of 
democracy among the people and pushing them to demand their rights (Gready and Robins, 2017). 
This has led scholars to consider the importance of civil society in shaping people’s understanding 
of justice and transition, and leading the dialogue between people and governments concerning 
what model of justice should be adopted. In short, the civil society should be viewed as a bridge 
that closes the gap between people and governments (Gready and Robins, 2017; Abouldahab, 
2017a). This role stands in addition to its traditional role of documenting, raising awareness, 
reporting, and providing human rights training.  
3.2. Building Thesis Hypotheses 
3.2.1. Anti-Western Sentiment in the Middle East Increases Refusal of TJ Pillars:  
Among the main issues recalled by Middle East scholars when discussing the 
implementation of any western norms or ideas, including TJ, is the anti-Western sentiment. 
Therefore, it is vital to discuss this issue as one of the main reasons behind the emerging calls 
toward localizing TJ in post Arab Spring countries.  
Most of the Arab population in the Middle East and North Africa hold anti-Western 
sentiment to varying degrees. What is meant by anti-Western sentiment is negative feelings and 
opposition to Western (including American or European) ideas, norms, and interventions. This 
anti-Western sentiment is a major concern among scholars addressing the failure of TJ in the Arab 
Spring. According to Mistry (2012), Arab societies do not trust international interventions (mostly 
Western) based on their previous colonial history, broad public opposition to any interference in 
national affairs. What worsened this distrust during the Arab Spring was the varying agendas of 
different international actors, and the consequent contradictions that occurred between national 
and international interests which threatened the TJ process. This has raised the important question 
of “whose interests transitional justice serves and what those interests are” (Abouldahab, 2017a:5).  
Moreover, Fisher argued that the international community has been highly selective and 
politicized when dealing with TJ after the Arab Spring, causing further outrage against the West. 




in deciding in which cases they would intervene and in what manner. Selectivity was also seen at 
the institutional level, such as in the ICC concerning who to prosecute internationally and who to 
leave for national prosecution, and which cases to examine. The prosecution process was therefore 
perceived as unevenly applied, bringing the fairness of it under suspicion. It was also apparent 
which national post-conflict governments the international institutions, which are dominated by 
Western powers, supported (Fisher, 2014). Thus, in the eyes of the Arab world, Western powers 
practiced favoritism that served their interests.  
Several surveys translate the current anti-Western sentiment into numbers. For example, a 
survey conducted by the Arab Center Washington DC in 2018 found that 79% of Arabs had 
negative views toward the US foreign Policy in the MENA region, while 45% viewed French 
foreign policies toward the MENA region as negative (with 19% abstentions from answering). 
More specifically, 80% of Arabs viewed US policy towards Yemen negatively, while 73% viewed 
US policy toward Libya negatively (Arab Center Washington DC, 2018). Widespread opposition 
to American and European Union (EU) intervention in Syria has also been demonstrated. 
According to the Pew Research Center, four out of five respondents surveyed in Arab countries 
(namely: Lebanon, Egypt, Tunisia, and Palestinian Territories) rejected any Western intervention 
in Syria (Pew Research Center, 2013). Another 2020 public opinion survey conducted by the Arab 
Barometer asked Arabs in 11 countries about Western motivations for aid. It found that overall, 
42% of the respondents said that the West wants to gain influence (with a majority in 5 out of 11 
countries holding this view); only 18% said that the West aims for economic development and 
12% said it aims to achieve internal stability (Arab barometer, 2020). All in all, these different 
surveys provide a strong indicator that Arabs in the MENA region react negatively toward the 
West, especially when it comes to aid and humanitarian intervention.  
3.2.2. Localizing Transitional Justice  
   Turning to the “local” has been a strong trend in recent TJ literature, in what is known 
as “localizing transitional justice”. This means shifting from applying international instruments 
and standards to using local, traditional, religious, cultural and often informal practices and 
rituals of the local populations in order to address their sorrows, achieve justice for victims, 




This trend toward the local was derived from three main critiques to the TJ process: 1) 
the top down dilemma, 2) the liberal paradigm of TJ and calls for instead using TfJ, which gives 
consideration to socio-cultural and economic issues, and 3) the legalism of TJ, which views TJ as 
a product of international lawyers and as practiced through formal institutions and courts such as 
the ICC, hybrid courts and state courts only (McEvoy, 2007), meanwhile ignoring legal 
pluralism, which posits that there could be several legal systems in the community, both formal 
and informal (Kochanski, 2020). The first two critiques were discussed thoroughly in the 
theoretical framework chapter above.  
Practically, localization of TJ has occurred in three main phases. The first phase was the 
UN’s acknowledgment of the importance of incorporating localism in the TJ process and the 
viability of local informal legal systems. For instance, former UN General Secretary Kofi Annan 
has stated that:  
Due regard must be given to indigenous and informal traditions for administering justice 
or settling disputes, to help them to continue their often vital role and to do so in 
conformity with both international standards and local tradition (UN, 2004:para.36).  
 In its 2009 report, the UN Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) 
stressed emphasis on the important role of traditional non-state actors in implementing pillars of 
TJ. OHCHR recalled the case of East Timor where “the consultation process prior to the 
establishment of the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation delivered findings that 
led to a significant expansion in the Commission’s mandate, for example by providing for the 
conduct of ‘community reconciliation procedures’, i.e., local community-based procedures for 
justice and reconciliation using traditional practices” (OHCHR, 2009:6).  
OHCHR has also considered the vital role religion and religious leaders play in conflict 
resolution, especially in Muslim countries. In its 2017 Beirut Declaration on “Faith for Rights”, 
OHCHR acknowledged that:  
As much as the notion of effective control provides the foundation for responsibilities of 
non-State actors in times of conflict, we see a similar legal and ethical justification in case 
of religious leaders who exercise a heightened degree of influence over the hearts and 





The second phase was demonstrated in the case of Rwanda, where the government 
decided to adopt traditional legal systems (called Gacaca courts) to prosecute hundreds accused 
of being involved in the Rwandan 1994 genocide. Adopting Gacaca courts, which consist of 
trustworthy men and local leaders, were considered a milestone in TJ’s turn towards localization. 
Dozens of articles have since studied the effectiveness of these courts in achieving justice for 
victims in ways they can understand, and with which they can engage. These courts were also 
viewed as truth commissions, where victims and witnesses talk about their real experiences with 
the hostilities. Several scholars have argued that applying such traditional tactics is time- and 
cost-effective, victim-oriented, and highly localized, thus having more credibility with, and being 
better able to address the needs of the people, providing more appropriate closure to their 
traumas than would formal international/national institutions like the ICC (Bolocan,2004; 
Wierzynska,2004; Iliff, 2012; Mukamusana, 2009; and Shaw et al.,2010).  
However, the use of Gacaca courts has not gone without criticism. Among the critiques 
were that it violates some fundamental human rights rules, such as the requirement of adequate 
legal representation (lawyers) for the accused, that there was an absence of women 
representation as women are prevented from participation in the hearings except when they are 
the victims, and other violations of the rules of a fair trial (Bolocan, 2004; Kochanski 2020). 
Other literature sheds light on problems related to state interference in these processes, biased 
decisions, and the variation of the hearings among different villages, which has made it difficult 
to examine the general effects of these procedures (Waldorf, 2013; Clark, 2010). This criticism 
of Gacaca courts is a vital aspect of the criticism of localizing TJ as a whole. Several scholars 
have questioned the actual success of local measures adopted in Rwanda and elsewhere, accusing 
their promoters of romanticization and idealism when touting the positive role of local processes 
(Sharp, 2014; McAuliffe, 2013; Macdonald, 2015; Kochanski, 2020).  
Finally, the third phase of the localization of TJ appeared in the several community-based 
informal procedures adopted in many post-conflict or conflicting states to address past atrocities. 
Several studies were conducted over the positive role of local TJ measures adopted in countries 




2009), East Timor (Kent, 2011), Burundi (Nee and Uvin, 2010), and Colombia (Simoni, 2016), 
among others.   
 When it comes to the Middle East and transitional justice, little has been said about what 
prospects localization has in the region. A few studies (discussed in the following sub-section) 
connect international standards with local practices and beliefs derived from sharia law, or 
attempt to apply restorative justice measures that exist in sharia law instead of the international 
standards, in order to achieve better results and more legitimacy. Almost none of the studies on 
TJ and the Arab Spring have contributed directly to the knowledge surrounding the possible 
effects of localization on making TJ work in Arab countries.  
Public opinion polls are recognized as an important tool in studying the possible effects 
applying local measures and rituals has on making TJ work in different contexts (Kochanski, 
2020). In this research, I will use an online poll of a “convenience” sample to capture an initial 
idea of what people in three Middle Eastern countries under study think of applying local 
religious measures implemented by local religious actors, instead of international measures by 
international actors, to TJ processes, while the outcome remains the same in both cases. Given 
Covid-19 restrictions on travel, an online survey was a very appropriate method for gathering 
data for this thesis. 
It is important to clarify that this study does not aim to examine the legality of the 
different local religious Islamic measures as compared to international and fundamental human 
rights. Rather, the study only aims at capturing the effects of changing the language and/or actors 
from international to local on people’s acceptance of the same outcomes.  
3.2.3. Transitional Justice and Islam  
When talking about localizing transitional justice, several processes could be considered, 
such as ethical, tribal, or religious customs. In the Middle East, where 93% of the population are 
Muslims (Pew Research Center, 2017) religion cannot be ignored, either in politics, justice, 
ideology, or social life; Islam is always part of the debate. Therefore, this thesis is focusing on 
Islam and Islamic rhetoric and traditions when studying localization of TJ in the Middle East.   
Even though, tribal law is also prominent in several Arab countries. It is important to 




thesis mentions tribes and tribal leaders, where needed, as part of the effect of Islam and Islamic 
culture. Due to the limited scope of this thesis, a deep study of tribal laws is not needed.   
3.2.3.1. Negative impact of Islam on the Arab Spring  
When it comes to transitioning toward democratization and the building of democratic 
institutions, Islam is usually viewed as having a negative impact. Khatib (2014) claimed that terms 
such as democracy and human rights are viewed by political Islamists as Western liberal products 
which are not relevant to local populations, proposing their own local packages of reform which 
are often drawn from conservative interpretations of Islam. The author took examples from Egypt, 
Syria and Tunisia to exemplify how the hybrid religio-political views of Islamists taking part in 
forming the new political life during transition hinders the possibility of healthy liberal democratic 
transitions in post-Arab Spring countries (Khatib, 2014). By “hybrid religio-political views” the 
author meant the Islamists’ attempts to combine the language of liberal democracy and the 
conservative ideas taken from Islamic laws and interpretations.  
In Tunisia, the only successful transition example in the Arab Spring, the attitudes of 
Islamic parties were an exception to the norm, according to several articles. Despite the fact that 
Islamists played a major role during the TJ process, Masri (2017) argued that the success of TJ in 
Tunisia is based on special characteristics of the country and its long history of leaning towards 
secularization. Hamid (2014), who based his findings on his interviews with Islamist political 
leaders in Tunisia, pointed out that Islamic parties were being pushed toward foreign liberalization.  
Huntington argued that the transition of a state toward democratization is based on three 
factors: political, cultural and economic, according to modernization theory (Huntington, 1991). 
He argued that in terms of negative cultural effects, Islam plays a major role in preventing Muslim 
countries from achieving development, and consequently, modernization and liberal transition. He 
attributed this to the argument that in Islam there is no separation between the state and religion, 
forcing the leaders to follow only the Sharia laws and to be guided by ulema (p.28). The reason 
why cultural factors seem to most negatively affect democratization is that these are the hardest to 
change. Huntington argued that culture is what divides “‘us’ versus ‘them’ relation[s]” 
(Huntington, 1993:29). It is people’s identity, therefore, there is a major resistance to any change, 
even a positive one. Hence, it is hard to achieve liberal TJ in Muslim countries, which usually view 




Yet, what Huntington seems to be missing is the fact that “Islam [does] not equal one 
Islam” (Metzger, 2002:7). In other words, there are different schools of Islam with different ideas 
about the relationship between state and religion. Besides the strictest Islam Fundamentalism, there 
is also Islamic reformism and secular modernism (Zapf, 2004). As was raised by Linz and Stepan 
(2013), there are many successful democracies of Muslim non-Arab countries which support this 
idea such as Turkey, Albania, Indonesia and Senegal, besides the 178 million Muslim native 
majorities living under democracy in India (p.17).  
3.2.3.2. Islam and justice in the literature 
In TJ literature, debates on the incorporation of Islam into TJ process have been ongoing 
since long before the Arab Spring, and have continued after. 
Abu-Nimer conducted a comparative study of Western and traditional Middle Eastern 
conflict resolution methods in order to discover whether Western methods could work in the 
Muslim Middle Eastern countries. The roots of traditional Middle Eastern conflict resolution 
methods are mainly laid down in Islamic sharia law, according to him (Abu-Nimer, 1996). His 
findings indicated that although there are many similarities in the two processes, which aim to 
reach the same goal of achieving justice and reconciliation, the ideologies behind them and the 
methods of implementation are different. He argued that social, historical, ideological and cultural 
differences between the East and the West must be taken into consideration when applying conflict 
resolution strategies into the Middle East. In addition to that, the author reiterated the negative role 
of anti-Western sentiment driven by colonial history and fear of Western hegemony over the East. 
Thus, Western norms, concepts and even processes must be modified and carefully applied in a 
way that respects the special characteristics of these countries (Abu-Nimer, 1996).  
Several other scholars have tried to find similarities or to demonstrate that Islamic sharia 
law contains interpretation of important international legal systems and justice processes. Given 
that sharia law is one of the “recognized legal systems in the world” (Maged, 2008:479) which is 
followed and officially accepted by more than 14% of the world’s population (world population 
review, Sharia Law Countries: 2020), those scholars have argued that the international system 
could benefit from this law in terms of conflict resolution, and application of transitional and 




Qafisheh (2012), Pely and Luzon (2018) and Fallon (2019) argued that many provisions of 
Islamic sharia law can be reflected in international standards of restorative and retributive justice 
systems. Qafisheh and Fallon both explained the Sharia provisions which they viewed as similar 
to the international restorative justice system. For example, they have explained how “Kasas” is 
similar to the concept of retaliation, “Dya” resembles compensation and reparation, “Afou” 
reflects pardon, and “Sulh” is quite similar to conciliation.  
Unlike Abu-Nimer who viewed local practices as deriving from sharia law, Fallon argued 
that it is important to distinguish between the limited and traditional implementation of some of 
these provisions in Muslim countries and Arab tribes. Additionally, there needs to be greater 
understanding of what these provisions really mean according to the main sources of Sharia, which 
are the holy Quran (God’s book) and the Hadith (speeches of the prophet Muhammed) (Fallon, 
2019:11), in order to be able to compare the two systems.  
Maged (2008) and Zoli et al. (2017) both built their arguments on the idea that both sharia 
and international laws are seeking to achieve the same goals, among which are “victim redress, 
establishment of truth, bringing closure to victims, and the prevention of conflict return” (Zoli et 
al, 2017:58). Both articles tried to draw pathways to incorporate Sharia into the international 
systems, examining avenues of compatibility between the two systems, and emphasizing the 
recognition of Sharia when working in Muslim countries. They posited that considering sharia law 
and understanding the cultural differences between East and West are vital for ensuring the full 
functioning of international legal system in Muslim countries, and building trust between those 
countries and the international system (Maged, 2008; Zoli et al,2017).  
Finally, in his article “Transitional justice in the Middle East and North Africa – taking 
account of Islam”, Yusuf (2017) argued for the idea of benefiting from the similarities between 
Sharia and international provisions in order to facilitate the TJ process in post-Arab Spring 
countries. He submitted that the problem of implementation of TJ in post-Arab Spring countries is 
that international standards find little legitimacy among Muslim populations who do not trust 
Western rules. Moreover, current TJ practices are exclusionary of religion, which is part of 
people’s daily lives in these countries. He added that since religion has strong legitimacy among 
Arab countries’ populations, the international community should actively draw from the 




processes (Yusuf, 2017). However, it is worth mentioning that the author based his findings on an 
assumption that Arab countries find religion more legitimate than international standards. There 
was no testing or mentioning of previous research that supported this.  
3.2.3.3. People in Muslim countries are affected by religion:  
According to Philpott (2007), the use of religious language and rationales when applying 
TJ is important for societies to heal from their traumas (Philpott, 2007:100). He argued for the 
positive role religious actors play in TJ processes, supporting this with studies of cases where 
religious actors applied measures of TJ using religious norms and provisions and achieved positive 
progress, such as in Guatemala, Mozambique, East Timor, and Nigeria.  
As has been mentioned earlier, unlike Western countries which have undergone separations 
between the religion and state, Muslim countries never went through such detachments (Mahdavi, 
2020). This lack of separation affects people’s mentality and how they think of religion in all 
aspects of their lives, including in politics. People view religion as the last safe-haven when 
everything else falls apart in a weak or a collapsing state (Platteau, 2007). Therefore, religious 
ideas, norms, and authorities play a major role in directing politics through gaining trust and 
acceptance from the people (Platteau, 2007). Inglehart et al. (2006) added in this regard that in 
situations of war or unstable states, communities tend to be more closed and admire their local 
cultures and traditions while resisting any foreign or unusual ideas  
Even in situations of peace and stability, Platteau stated that religious rhetoric is used by 
leaders (even non-religious ones) of Muslim countries to strengthen their power, gain more 
credibility, or achieve political goals (Platteau, 2007). Although this thesis does not engage with 
politics, the findings of Platteau are of particular importance, as they support the hypothesis that 
using Islamic rules and rhetoric is highly impactful in gaining legitimacy among the people of 
Muslim countries.   
Returning to TJ and the Arab Spring, Mahdavi supported Platteau’s findings by arguing 
that a metaphor of “post-Islamism” is the idea that is leading societies of the Arab Spring today. 
Post-Islamism is defined as: 
A dialogical discourse. It promotes dialogue between tradition and modernity, faith and 




binaries in postcolonial MENA. It expedites the possibility of emerging Muslim 
modernities by challenging a singular concept of Western modernity and promotes the idea 
of alternative modernities and ‘multiple modernities […] it encourages the public role of 
religion in civil society and political society. However, unlike Islamism, it challenges the 
concept and legitimacy of Islamic state. The state is a secular entity and cannot be 
Islamized’ (Mahdavi, 2020:23). 
In short, he argued that religion should not be ignored when applying TJ in post-Arab 
Spring societies. It should be moderately considered as part of what ordinary people support and 
believe in, since, even though there were no calls for Islamizing the state, the people still accepted 
religion in their public and private lives, however avoiding hegemony of pure religion or pure 
neoliberalism (Mahdavi, 2020).  
In summary, there is wide agreement among scholars that Islamic religion should be 
considered, and even drawn from, when approaching issues related to the ordinary people of 
Muslim countries. Many arguments were made regarding the similarities between sharia law and 
some international laws, especially in issues of transitional and restorative justice, claiming that 
both have similar goals. Therefore, the international community should consider Sharia when 
applying TJ into the MENA region.  
Most of the literature in this regard is based on qualitative research. What is missing is a 
quantitative assessment of how current Arab populations react to Sharia in process of TJ and how 
legitimate they find it compared to international standards. Hence, this thesis aims at filling this 
gap through using statistical analysis of a quantitative public opinion poll survey, designed to 
capture people’s attitudes toward religion and local implementation as compared to international 
standards implemented by foreign actors. In particular, it uses experimental methods and causal 
inference to make its claims.  
3.3. Thesis Hypotheses:  
Based on transformative justice theory, which argues that considering the culture and 
religion when applying transitional justice and allowing the locals to implement the process of TJ, 
leads to more positive results, the following hypotheses were developed for this thesis:  




If the international community (the UN) addresses the population of Arab countries using norms 
of Islamic culture instead of the international language of transitional justice, the likelihood of 
acceptance of transitional justice outcomes will be increased at the local level.  
Hypothesis 2: 
If the international community (the UN) supports local actors, especially religious actors, in the 
implementation processes of transitional justice, instead of relying on foreign intervention, the 
likelihood of acceptance of transitional justice outcomes will be increased at the local level.  
 
A third hypothesis was also developed from Platteau’s and Inglehart’s et al. arguments that people 
view religion as the last safe haven in unstable states:  
Hypothesis 3:  
People in unstable states are more likely to support religious outcomes than people of stable 
countries.  
4. Research Design and Methodology.  
4.1. Study Area and Sampling  
Three countries have been chosen as the main study area for this research: Libya, Yemen, 
and Jordan. Libya and Yemen represent post-Arab Spring countries, where TJ processes are 
occurring, but do not seem to be successful so far, as both countries have slipped into years of civil 
war. Two countries were chosen instead of one in order to make it possible to generalize the results 
to other Arab Spring countries to the highest possible degree. The purpose behind adding Jordan 
to the case studies, despite it not being among the countries where TJ is implemented, is in order 
to make comparison between people’s views in unstable versus stable Arab states. Hence, 
illuminating further the possibility of generalizing the study results on other Arab countries. Next 
is an overview of the uprisings and how far they developed in each case study, the social and 
religious structure of the populations under study, as well as the reasons behind the selection of 
each country for inclusion in this study.   





Table 1:  
Comparison among case studies.  
                       Libya                                  Yemen                                    Jordan   





lack of accountability/ 
regime change. 
High rates of poverty/ 
unemployment, 
corruption/ lack of 
accountability/ regime 
change. 
High rates of poverty/ 
unemployment, 
corruption/ reform of 
current government.  
Current 
situation 






actors (civil war) 





little trust in the formal 
legal system. 
Empty institutions/ 
little trust in the 
formal legal system.  
Functioning institutions 




Tribal/ tribal law is 
functioning as justice 
system among locals/ 
plays a role in politics.   
Tribal/ tribal law is 
functioning as justice 
system among locals 
in most of the 
cities/plays a role in 
politics. 
Tribal/ tribal law is 
functioning in selected 
cases to settle some 
family conflicts/ plays 





Muslim tribal leaders 
have huge impact in the 
society  
Muslim Country/ 
religious leaders are 
playing a main role in 
settling conflicts.  
Muslim Country/ sharia 
law is part of the basic 
law/ religious leaders 
have prominent 






Forty-two years of Al-Qaddafi’s authoritarian regime cultivated a weak country, with no 
real institutions that could lead the state during the difficult aftermath of the overthrow of the 
regime in 2011 (Vandewalle, 2012). The uprisings, despite positive expectations among scholars 
of the possibility for successful TJ in Libya (Gaub, 2014; Vandewalle, 2012), ended with a deep 
divide within society and a civil war between two camps, with massive intervention from several 
countries. Anger and protests followed the first elections of the House of Representatives in 2014, 
which challenged the legitimacy of the results, as only 18% of the population voted (Candelli, 
2018:56). The final result of this outrage was two parallel governments in Libya, an internationally 
recognized government called the Presidency Council based in the capital Tripoli and led by 
president Fayez Al-Saraaj, and an opposing government of the elected House of Representatives 
in coalition with a secular military coalition called “Operation Dignity”, led by Gen Khalifa 
Haftaar (Candelli, 2018).  
The intervening foreign powers which support either one of the camps with political 
backing, money, training, troops, and military equipment, are divided as follow: Egypt, United 
Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, France and Russia supporting Khalifa Haftaar’s camp, while 
Turkey, Qatar, USA, and Italy supporting the UN- recognized government of Al Saraaj (BBC, 
2020; Aljazeera, 2020). It is important to highlight this international intervention of different actors 
while investigating this thesis hypotheses. 
Shedding light on the structure of the Libyan society is of great significance to this study. 
In this regard, Libyan society is a strongly tribal and religious society which is based on the values 
of “family, tribe, religion and town” (Ben Lamma, 2017:5). In Libya, tribes play a major role in 
political life through lending support and loyalty to several political actors. They also supported 
and sometimes led the protests which took down the regime (Al-Shadeedi & Ezzeddine, 2019). 
Additionally, they play a vital role in putting an end to a lot of conflicts and problems at the local 
level and encouraging justice (Ben Lamma, 2017), often through the use of Islamic tools of conflict 
resolution, such as Sulh. Religion in Libya plays a major role in the daily life of citizens. Libyan 
society is majority Muslim Sunni (97%) (U.S.Embassy in Libya, 2018). Sawani (2012) as cited in 
Schnelzer (2016) has stated that Islam “has remained a central component of the cultural 




Therefore, some studies on TJ in Libya have argued that the country and the international 
community should make use of the tribal nature of Libyan society and from its Islamic ideology 
to achieve a successful TJ process. Showaia (2014) argued that tribes hold immense credibility 
and trust among the population, thus, they could play a positive role in settling conflicts, uniting 
people (reconciliation), providing reparation for victims, and assisting the process of truth 
commissions. Moreover, Islamic culture has been argued to be able to settle political conflicts 
through the use of “Sulh”, which can be translated into the words of reconciliation and reparation, 
according to the Showaia.  
These factors of religion and local culture in Libya were two determining aspects behind 
the choice of Libya as one of the case studies. Besides this, the present author has some personal 
relations with persons in Libya who could distribute the survey and make sure that it reaches the 
wider population. This was also key, as the unstable situation in the country made it impossible to 
do direct research in the field.  
4.1.1.2. Yemen  
Inspired by the protests of Tunisia and Egypt, Yemeni protests erupted in January 2011 
against the dire economic conditions, high rates of unemployment, corruption and lack of 
accountability which continued over 34 years under former president Ali Abdullah Saleh’s regime 
(Karakir, 2018). The protests ended with the signing of an agreement in November 2011, with a 
mediation from the Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, UAE, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and 
Oman) and the support of the USA. The agreement protected Saleh and his family from being 
prosecuted, and kept his position as the chair of his party, while he stepped down from presidency 
in favor of his vice president Abdal Rab Mansour Al-Hadi. A National Dialogue Conference 
(NDC) was also held among all political groups of Yemen to draft a new constitution (Karakir, 
2018).  
Later, the NDC failed and Houthi forces4, allied with pro-Saleh groups who were 
unsatisfied with the agreement, clashed with Hadi’s forces and took control of the capital San’a, 
as well as many northern parts of the country, reaching Adan. This eventually forced president 
 
4 Houthi Forces: “Zaydi Shiite revivalist political and insurgent movement formed in the northern Yemeni 
governorate of Sa'dah under the leadership of members of the Houthi family. The group was allied with former 




Hadi to flee to Saudi Arabia where he sought military intervention from Gulf countries to regain 
control. In January 2016, Operation Golden Arrow was launched by Saudi Arabia, UAE and 
Egypt, against Houthi forces in Yemen (Karakir, 2018). More than five years of conflict in Yemen 
caused one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world, with extremely high levels of 
malnutrition, poverty and pandemics among the population (Karakir, 2018).  
Bringing justice to the country is not an easy mission, as decades of Saleh’s rule caused 
empty institutions and a lack of legitimacy of the national legal system. This situation only 
worsened during the conflict (Gaston and Al-Dawsari, 2017). Yemen is a tribal community with 
Muslim majority (99.1%) (PEW Templeton, 2016) where tribes and religion have strong 
credibility and power. Therefore, they play a leading role in settling conflicts and pursuing justice 
in society. This is in addition to local religious leaders who engage in conflict resolutions and are 
trusted by the majority-Muslim population of Yemen (Gaston and Al-Dawsari, 2017). In their 
paper, Gatson and Al-Dawari (2017) claim that any attempt at applying TJ in the country cannot 
succeed without benefiting from the local dispute resolution system of tribes and religious leaders. 
They argue that cooperation programs should be launched with these local systems, while working 
parallelly at rebuilding public trust in the formal justice system. This argument is directly related 
to the hypotheses of this thesis. The rising power of tribes and religious leaders as the main conflict 
resolution system in the country is a main motivator of the choice of Yemen as a case study.  
4.1.1.3. Jordan  
Unlike other Arab Spring countries, the 2011 demonstrations of Jordan were limited, 
peaceful, and were not calling for the overthrow of the regime. Rather, people were demanding 
reforms of the current government, an end to corruption, and improving of the economic conditions 
which had led to high rates of poverty (Barari and Satkowski,2012). King Abdullah of Jordan took 
immediate steps to rectify the tension in the streets and placate the people by ordering the formation 
of a new government and applying quick reforms (Barari and Satkowski,2012). All in all, Jordan 
did not enter the phase of TJ and remained a stable state with functioning institutions and legal 
systems.  
When it comes to social and religious factors, like Libya and Yemen, Jordan’s society is 
mostly tribal, and considers itself as religious. Tribes in Jordan play major roles in politics, 




through unwritten codes known as “tribal law”, which includes many Islamic concepts such as 
“Sulh” and “Dya” (Antoun, 2000).  
The official website of the Jordanian Embassy in Washington DC states that Jordan is an 
Islamic state with 92% Sunni Muslims, and 1% Shia and Sufi Muslims (Jordan Embassy USA, 
2008). The country incorporated sharia law into its basic law, particularly through family law and 
courts (Williamson, 2019). Local religious leaders also hold prominent positions in the country 
and within society, with the “Mufti” standing as the main religious figurehead who represent 
official Islam in the state (Williamson, 2019).  
Jordan was chosen as the third case study due to it being a fairly stable and peaceful Arab 
Muslim country. Adding Jordan to the cases allows us to study whether the preferences of Arabs 
differ across situations of peace and war. By having three cases, two of war and one of peace, there 
is more potential to generalize the outcomes of the study onto different Arab Muslim states. 
Moreover, some of the hypotheses in this thesis tests relate directly to rule of law.  
4.1.2. Sampling and Data Collection  
The population was divided according to country (first stage), and in the second stage, 
random samples were chosen by publishing the survey on three social media platforms (Facebook 
and Twitter and WhatsApp). Using Facebook to collect a random sample could be considered a 
sufficient method, as a majority of the population from the three countries are on this Platform. 
According to StatCounter5 Global Stats (2020), as of June 2020, 70.7% of Libyan population, 
87.5% of Yemeni population, and 88.7% of Jordanian population are on Facebook. Twitter is less 
popular in Arab countries: 9.4% of Libya, 2.2% of Yemen, and 1% of Jordan population are online 
on Twitter according to the same source.   
In order to reach the people of the targeted countries and ensure a fairly equal chance for 
any person from the population to participate, three strategies were used: 1) spread the survey 
through friends and acquaintances from Libya, Yemen, and Jordan, who published it on their 
platforms, WhatsApp groups, Facebook groups, and for their families, neighbors and friends who 
 
5 StatCounter is a marketing and statistics company founded in 1999. One of its projects is Global Stats which is a 
web analytic service that analyzes page visits to different websites. For each visit, the browser, operating system, 





are not online; 2) spread the survey on private and public Facebook groups with high numbers of 
people from any of the three countries; and 3) ask some public figures with a high number of 
followers from different Arab countries on Facebook and Twitter to share the survey on their 
platforms.  
During data gathering, and in order to prevent bias in the results, the survey was shared 
with people who are controlled by different governments inside the countries where civil war 
exists. This was conducted through posting on some Facebook groups whose members are from 
certain cities in Yemen, and through friends in Libya, as the author knows people from both the 
areas controlled by the Gen Haftaar government, and the areas under the UN- recognized 
government.  
When it comes to the sample size, the plan was to collect at least 390 responses (130 from 
each country) in order to conduct the opinion poll analysis with a confidence level of 90% and 
margin of error 10%. An online power calculator was used to determine the minimum sample size 
needed for adequate power with a 90% confidence level6. This goal was achieved as 435 responses 
were collected in total from the three countries.  
4.2. Quantitative Survey Method  
Quantitative methods are used to calculate quantities and identify the relationships between 
variables, after running different careful procedures on the collected data (Bowling, 2005). 
Quantitative methods are usually deductive, and thus are suitable for testing hypotheses derived 
from pre-existing literature and information about certain phenomena (Bowling, 2005). Surveys 
are one of the most popular quantitative tools used in social science for collecting data from a 
specific sample of the population.  
A descriptive structured survey method is used in this thesis. This is because descriptive 
surveys are suitable to test hypotheses, describe features of the population, and study the 
relationship between the tested variables. It is also more efficient in terms of time and money as 
compared to, say, longitudinal surveys (Bowling, 2005). I have also chosen to use a structured 
survey where a standardized set of questions, answers and scales are used. This type of survey 






numbers of people to participate easily. On the other hand, it restricts the choices of answers, which 
might force some respondents to skew themselves towards certain answers which might not be 
entirely sufficient to capture their real opinions. It also assumes that all participants will understand 
the wording of questions in the same way (Bowling, 2005).  
In order to overcome the problem of insufficient response options, the response “Do not 
know or refuse to answer” was added to all the questions. Moreover, to make sure that people from 
different educational levels and environments understand the wording the same way, a pilot study 
was run on 10 people (2 with secondary education, 2 with elementary education, 3 with bachelor’s 
degrees, 3 with master’s degrees). The pilot sample was asked individually about what they 
understood from the questions, whether all questions were clear and easy to read and understand, 
and why they answered the way they did. Some changes to the survey were made based on the 
pilot study, which will be discussed after introducing the survey.   
In this study, experimental method has been utilized in order to control all other variables 
in the introduced scenarios except the independent variable. This way, the experimenter ensures 
the cause of the answer is solely driven by the change in the independent variable (causal 
inferences). Moreover, because the respondents in two out of three countries are living in a 
situation of war, it was vital to consider that the answers are not biased by respondents’ background 
experiences (McDermott, 2002).  
In order to overcome problems of experimental biases, computed online survey does not 
allow direct interaction between the experimenter and the respondent. Therefore, the experimenter 
cannot intervene to direct the respondent to a certain answer. Moreover, biases from demand 
characteristics, which can occur when the aim of the experiment is very clear (McDermott, 2002), 
was overcome through making sure that any additional questions aside of the experiment were 
asked after the experiment questions are answered. This ensures that the respondent is not affected 
by the answers he/she provided before the experiment starts, and that the experiment aim is not 
guessed. In the pilot study, respondents were asked whether they understood what this research is 
about, and all respondents of the pilot study stated that it was confusing, and they could not 
understand the final aim behind the survey questions.   
External validity, i.e. generalizability, was also considered in this research through 




sample size is not big, some kind of external validity could be achieved. It is worth to mention that 
in order to achieve high external validity in political science experiments it is useful to run the 
same experiment on different samples of the same population over a period of time (McDermott, 
2002). However, due to the time limit of this research, this was not possible to achieve.  
4.2.1. The Survey  
The survey in this study was conducted in Arabic as it is the native language in the three 
countries being studied. It consisted of three blocks: The first block included demographic 
questions (age, gender, educational level, country of origin and region). The second block 
consisted of three experiment scenarios. For the purpose of the experiment, the parts in parentheses 
(see the scenarios below) are randomized in and out. Respondents were randomly and evenly 
assigned into either a control or a treatment group. The control group constitutes of those 
respondents who randomly got the experiment scenario with the independent variable international 
law as the source of the decision, and the UN as the implementor. Whereas the treatment group is 
the one who got the experiment scenarios with the independent variable sharia law as the source 
of the decision and local religious leaders (rijal al-islah) as the implementors. However, each 
scenario is either westernized altogether or localized altogether. In other words, the source of the 
procedure and the actor introduced are both either local or western (international). The outcome is 
controlled in all scenarios. 
Initially, there was an attempt to randomize the source of procedure (decision) and the 
actor. However, when running the pilot study, respondents found it unrealistic that the UN will 
implement sharia law, or that local religious leaders shall implement international laws. Therefore, 
the independent variable in each experiment is binary.  
In order to capture which of the two independent variables is affecting the results, three 
sub-questions were asked after each scenario, with an additional sub-question asked after scenario 
1. 
The first and second sub-questions in all three scenarios were designed to capture whether 
a religious source for the procedure is providing more legitimacy than an international source.  
The third sub-question in all three scenarios and the fourth sub-question in scenario 1 were 




decision and viewed as more proper institution to decide than an international actor (legitimacy of 
actors). 
The reason behind designing three experiment scenarios is to increase generalizability 
across three different pillars of transitional justice. Scenario 1 is a case of reparation for individual 
victims. Scenario 2 is concerning achieving reconciliation across the nation. And scenario 3 is to 
achieve criminal justice through prosecuting highly ranked perpetrators. To illustrate more, I 
wanted to capture whether the effect of source of the procedure or the actor is different among 
different situations on different levels (individual, national peace, and accountability). The 
Scenarios are as follows:    
Scenario 1: Reparation, concerning specific victims, closer to victims and justice for them, 
local community.  
 During the conflict, a family’s home was bombed. Their house was completely destroyed 
and 3 of them ended up with disabilities. In an attempt to gain justice for this family and to achieve 
peace in the community more broadly, (the United Nations/ rijal Al-Islah) consisting of local 
religious imams) assigned (compensation/ Dya) to this family in accordance with (International 
law/ sharia law). The (compensation/Dya) shall include the value of treatment, compensation for 
the damage, and the value of the bombed house and furniture7.  
(Matrix Table) 
 Sub-Q1: Do you believe that the outcome of this scenario will help to bring about peace to the 
community?  
Sub-Q2: Do you agree with the decision in this scenario?  
Sub-Q3: Could the United Nations/Rijal Al-Islah enforce this decision?  
Sub-Q4: Do you agree that (the United Nations/Rijal Al-Islah) is the proper institution to decide 
the (compensation/Dya)?  
Answer Choice: 1. Yes                2. No                         3. Do not Know   
 
 
7 The exact amount of the compensation/Dya was omitted after the pilot study, as it seemed to be affecting the 
respondents’ answers. In other words, the respondents decided based on their satisfaction with the amount not 




 Scenario 2: Reconciliation and forgiveness of perpetrators involved in civil conflict.  
During the conflict, the (United Nations/ men of reconciliation (rijal al-islah) consisting of local 
religious imams) seek to achieve (peace/sulh) between those who were involved. However, as 
this was a civil war, there are too many perpetrators to put them all on trial or punish them all. 
Therefore, (The UN/rijal al-islah) have offered a pardon based on values of (international law/ 
Sulh according to the Sharia) for subordinate soldiers of all parties who were involved in lesser 
violations. The (UN/ rijal al-islah) based this decision on the principles set forth in (the 
internationally ratified Geneva Conventions/the Quran).   
Prosecution will be limited to the most highly ranked leaders only.  
- Article 6 of Protocol 2: “At the end of hostilities, the authorities in power shall endeavor to 
grant the broadest possible amnesty to persons who have participated in the armed conflict.”  
Or  
  - Verse 40 of Surah Ash-Shurah in the Quran: “whoever pardons and makes reconciliation, his 
reward is [due] from Allah”.  
If you were one of the civilians who were affected by the conflict, do you agree with the 
following? (Matrix table): 
Sub-Q1: Do you believe that the outcome will help to bring about peace to the community?  
Sub-Q2: Do you agree with the idea of pardon that was introduced in this scenario? 
Sub-Q3: Do you think this actor has the ability to enforce this decision?  
Answer Choices: 1. Yes            2. No                    3. Do not Know.  
 
Scenario 3: Accountability, justice for the nation as a whole. Wronged the nation, 




After the end of the conflict, the Minister of the Economy was arrested for corruption related to 
the confiscation of the property of opposition party members and discrimination against them. 
He was tried in (an international special tribunal created by the United Nations / a local religious 
court created by rijal Al-Islah consisting of local religious imams). According to the tenets of 
(international laws/ sharia laws), the (UN/local religious) court sentenced the minister to return 
all of the confiscated money in addition to a (fine/ taizier) to be equivalent to the value of harm 
to the community and the affected groups. He was also sentenced to 5 years in jail for 
discrimination.  
Taizier: A penalty based on the court’s discretion. It is decided on people who commit crimes 
that do not have a specific provision in the Sharia.  
(Matrix Table) 
Sub-Q1: Do you believe that the outcome will help to bring about peace to the community.  
Sub-Q2: Do you agree with the decision of the (UN/local religious) court? 
Sub-Q3: Do you think that the (UN/local religious) court has the ability to enforce this decision?  
Answer Choices: 1. Yes        2. No        3. Do not Know. 
*** 
 Finally, the third block included a set of follow-up questions that may help to analyze the 
experiment results. The first question handled whether the respondent ever travelled to Europe or 
US and the duration of the trip, as spending time in a foreign country might have an effect on how 
the person views and understands the international system and his/her views of anti-westernism 
might be affected. The next two questions (mirror questions) were on whether the respondent ever 
interacted with the UN/international law, or “rijal al-islah”, in what way, and whether he/she was 
satisfied with the interaction. Next, two questions on religion and religiosity were asked, as this 
might affect respondent s’ views on sharia law and Muslim religious leaders. In order to understand 
which of the two independent variables affected the results more, the response options were a scale 
of 1-5, asking to what extent the respondents trust in 1) the UN, 2) rijal al-islah, 3) the courts and 
local legal system of their country. Finally, five questions were asked about the respondents’ 




of Sharia and civil laws, and if they think that foreign interference from 4) the West, and 5) other 
Arab and Muslim countries are negatively affecting reform in their countries (see Appendix A for 
the complete survey in English).   
4.2.2. Dependent and Independent Variables  
The independent variable in this research is the combination of the source of decision and 
the implementing body: international law/the UN in the scenarios of the control group versus 
sharia law/rijal al-islah in the scenarios of the experiment group. The dependent variables are 
respondents’ answers to the questions that followed each scenario.  
4.3 Data Analysis  
In order to analyze the survey data, the respondents were divided into two groups, where 
group 1 is the control group that received the version of the experiment where the independent 
variable was international law as source of decision, and the implementer was an international 
actor. Group 2 is the treatment group, on which all hypotheses were tested. The independent 
variable for Group 2 scenarios was sharia law as the source of decision, and the implementer is 
local religious men/ rijal al-islah. All other variables were the same for both groups.  
SPSS program has been used for this project. Independent samples t-test was run on the 
data to determine if there is a significant difference between the answers of control and treatment 
groups (Zwan, 2019). When cleaning the data, (Yes) answers were given the value of (1) while 
(No) answers were given the value of (0) and (do not know) answers were cleaned as they do not 
provide any information about respondents’ preferences. This cleaning of No answers as (0) and 
Yes as (1) allowed a correct t-test results to be achieved as it is mainly calculating the mean of 
(Yes) answers proportion in both groups.   
 In SPSS, only two-tailed t-test could be run. Therefore, the direction is determined using 
the direction of the t-value (negative or positive). To illustrate, the t-value in SPSS is calculated 
using the mean of group 1 (control group in this case) minus the mean of group 2 (treatment group 
in this case). Thus, when the t-value is positive then the direction is toward group 1, while negative 
t-value show that the direction is toward group 2 (IBM, 2020). In this thesis’s case, negative value 
means that the direction is toward treatment group (hypothesis supported) while positive value 




To increase robustness of the results, crosstabulations/Chi-Square test (2-tailed) has been 
run on the data to decide if the two groups are independent from each other. Chi-Square test is a 
proper test to run when data are categorical (such as this research’s Yes/No data) rather than 
numeric (Zwan, 2019). The direction of the significant difference could be determined through 
observing the percentages in the crosstabulations. Another way to overcome this problem is to use 
crosstabulations/Kenddell’s tau-c test which shows the direction of significance with positive and 
negative values of the test (Berman and Wang, 2018). Both tests (independent samples t-test and 
crosstabs/chi-square test) provided the same results (see Appendix C for SPSS result tables).  
In this research, results will be reported as significant on less than 0.05 p-value. P-values 
less than 0.10 will also be considered as marginally significant. 0.10 p-value is considered  viable 
by social scientists especially when the sample size is small, as is the case in this research 
(Lavrakas, 2008).  
5. Data and Results  
5.1. Data  
The overall number of completed, collected responses over a month of survey distribution 
is 435. By country, 167 responses from Libya, 119 responses from Yemen, and 149 responses 
from Jordan were collected. Therefore, this sample is considered sufficient to conduct the thesis 
analysis.  
In this section, I will briefly describe respondents’ answers on block 3 questions and the 
difference among countries when needed. Demographic characteristics of the respondents are 
explained in the charts and tables in Appendix B.   
5.1.1. Block 3 Answers8:  
A. Religion and Religiosity:  
When it comes to religion, vast majority of the sample are Muslims (412 out of 435), this 
gives an indicator that the respondents understand the Islamic terms and definitions and might 
have used them in their lives. For religiosity, I have used a question from the Arab Barometer as a 
measure9. The question asks: Do you pray daily? The respondents show high levels of religiosity 
 
8 For more detailed tables and Charts see Appendix B.  




as 70% stated that they always pray daily while another 12.4% said that they pray daily most of 
the time.  
B. Have you ever travelled to Europe or USA?10  
When it comes to travelling to Europe or USA, it is found that more than half of participants 
(59.1%) have never travelled, whereas 16.8% travelled for less than two months and only 16.6% 
of respondents travelled for more than a year continuously. Therefore, this factor is not likely to 
play a significant role in respondents’ ideas about the East and West.   
C. Levels of Trust in the UN, rijal al-islah, and the courts and legal system: 
I have asked the participants about how much they trust in each of the following: the UN, 
rijal al-islah of local religious men and imams, and the courts and legal system of their country. 
The answers are based on a scale of 1 to 5 (1= no trust, 5= totally trust). In the results, 75.9% of 
respondents do not trust the UN. While slightly more than half of respondents do not trust rijal al-
islah of local religious men and Imams (show less than 3 on the scale). Finally, a little more than 
half of respondents do not trust the legal system of their countries. For more detailed data, see 
Figures 5,6 and 7 in Appendix B.  
When it comes to levels of trust by country, 80.8% of Libyans, 75.6% of Yemenis and 
70.4% of Jordanians do not trust the UN (scaled less than 3). These results are supported by the 
information we have from the literature review on anti-Westernism. Meanwhile, 67.8% of 
Libyans, 84% of Yemenis and 49.6% of Jordanians do not trust rijal al-islah of local religious men 
and Imams. These results are quite surprising compared to the qualitative information from the 
literature review on people’s reliance on rijal al-islah to solve their problems, especially in Yemen 
and Libya. Trust in the courts and legal system in both Libya and Jordan show quite higher results 
of trust than rijal al-islah and the UN (56.9% of Libyans and 57% of Jordanians gave 3 or more 
stars on the scale). On the other hand, results from Yemen showed similarities to the qualitative 
data on people’s mistrust in the local courts and legal system, as only 9% of Yemeni respondents 
answered 3 or more stars on the scale on this question.   
 





When asked about interaction with either UN/ international law or rijal al-islah, about two 
third of respondents (68%) never sought help from local religious imams in their countries (rijal 
al-islah). Slightly more than half of respondents never interacted with the UN/International law 
(58.6%), whereas 20.5% studied about the UN/International law (See tables 2 and 3 in Appendix 
B). When asked about the reasons for non-interaction, the majority of respondents (66%) regarding 
rijal al-islah, and 41.2% regarding the UN, attributed the reason to not needing their help, while a 
quite similar percentage of respondents said that they do not trust them (25% rijal al islah/ 21.2% 
the UN). Finally, when asked about satisfaction with their interactions (for those who answered 
yes on the interaction question), 72.6% of respondents were satisfied with the help of their local 
imams. On the contrary, only 16.2% were satisfied by the UN/ international organizations’ help.    
D. Participants’ preference of Sharia Law or International Law: 
Three questions, inspired by Pew Research Center11, have been asked to capture people’s 
desire of having their local laws compatible with Sharia Law, International Law, or a mix of Sharia 
and civil laws. The questions were:  
 
 It was found that respondents in general agreed the most with option C (mix of Sharia and 
civil laws) (43.4% totally agreed, and 38.9% agreed to some extent). Sharia Law also received 
high positive reactions (28.7% totally agreed, and 43.7% agreed to some extent), whereas making 
 
11 Pew Research Center (2013): https://www.pewforum.org/2013/04/30/the-worlds-muslims-religion-politics-
society-overview/ 
a. The government in your country should make laws compatible with sharia laws.  
b. The government in your country should make laws compatible with the international 
laws.  
c. The government in your country should implement sharia laws in some areas and civil 
(local) laws in other areas.   




laws compatible with international law garnered less support. Only 9.2% totally agreed, and 35.6% 
agreed to some extent, while 40.5% disagreed (see figures 8, 9 and 10 in Appendix B).  
E. Participants’ opinion on foreign intervention (Western and Arab/Muslim):  
Two questions were asked to capture levels of anti-Westernism and levels of refusal of 
other Arab/Muslim countries’ intervention12:  
As the questions succeeded in capturing anti-Westernism (64.8% totally agreed, and 21.6% 
agreed to some extent that western intervention is an obstacle to reform), the questions also showed 
that there is resistance to intervention of any type, as 57.7% agreed totally and 24.4% agreed to 
some extent that interference from other Arab and Muslim countries also constitutes an obstacle 
to reform in their own countries.  
Furthermore, the data illustrated significant differences (p=0.00 < 0.05) between the 
countries of civil war (Libya and Yemen) and the non-waring Jordan in their views about 
interference from other Arab and Muslim countries (See table 4 in Appendix B). Jordanians are 
less hostile about Arab and Muslim intervention in comparison with Yemen and Libya, whereas 
no similar difference (p=0.277 >0.05) was captured among all three countries in their negative 
views about Western interference (See table 5 in Appendix B).    
5.2. Results    
In this section I present the results of the experiments in order of the hypotheses I had developed 
for testing in this study.  
Section 5.2.1. Outcomes of the First Experiment 
Scenario 1: Concerning specific victims, closer to victims and justice for them, local community:  
 
12 Copied from Arabbarometer Wave IV questionnaire: https://www.arabbarometer.org/wp-
content/uploads/ABIV_Questionnaire_ENG-2.pdf 
a. Interference from other Arab and Islamic countries is an obstacle to reform in your 
country.  
b. Interference from the west within is an obstacle to reform in your country   




H1a: On average, respondents will believe that the outcome justified by sharia law is more 
capable of bringing peace to the community.  
Hypothesis is Marginally Supported. There is a significant difference between control group 
(M=0.45, SD=0.498) and treatment group (M=0.54, SD=0.500); t (412) = -1.867, p=0.063.  
H1b: On average, respondents will accept the outcomes determined according to sharia law 
by the local religious imams.   
Hypothesis is Not Supported. There was no significant difference between control group 
(M=0.61, SD=0.489) and treatment group (M=0.66, SD=0.476); t (413) =-1.001, p=0.318.  
H1c: On average, respondents will believe that local religious imams are more capable of 
enforcing the outcomes than international actors (i.e., the United Nations).   
Hypothesis is rejected. There is a significant difference between control group (M=0.27, 
SD=0.447) and treatment group (M=0.16, SD=0.367); t (393) =+2.776, p=0.006. To reiterate, 
positive t-value indicates that the direction is toward control group (international scenario).  
H1d: On average, respondents will agree that local religious imams are the proper 
institution to decide the outcome comparing to international institutions (i.e. the United 
Nations).  
Hypothesis is rejected. There is a significant difference between control group (M=0.42, 
SD=0.494) and treatment group (M=0.31, SD=0.464); t (390) = +2.186, p=0.029.   
Section 5.2.2: Outcomes of the Second Experiment 
Scenario 2: Reconciliation and forgiveness of perpetrators involved in civil conflict. (A verse 
from the Quran was introduced as a justification of the suggested outcome, vis-à-vis an article 
from Protocol 2 of Geneva Conventions).  
H2a: On average, respondents will believe that the outcome justified by Sharia is more 
capable of bringing peace to the community.   
Hypothesis is rejected. There is a significant difference between control group (M=0.29, SD= 
0.456) and treatment group (M=0.13, SD=0.336); t (406) = +4.059, p=0.000  




Hypothesis is supported. There is a significant difference between control group (M=0.56, 
SD=0.497) and treatment group (M=0.66, SD=0.475); t (421) = -2.086, p=0.038. To reiterate, 
negative t-value indicates that the direction of significance is toward treatment group (localized 
scenario).  
H2c: On average, respondents will believe that local religious imams are more capable of 
enforcing the outcomes than international actors (i.e., the United Nations).  
Hypothesis is not supported. There is no significant difference between control group (M=0.58, 
SD=0.495) and treatment group (M=0.63, SD=0.485); t (407) = -0.958, p=0.338.  
Section 5.2.3: Outcomes of the Third Experiment.  
Scenario 3: Justice for the nation as a whole. Wronged the nation, representative for the country:  
H3a: On average, respondents will believe that the outcome justified by sharia law is more 
capable of bringing peace to the community.    
Hypothesis could be rejected on 0.10 p level. There is a significant difference between control 
group (M=0.76, SD=0.428) and treatment group (M=0.67, SD=0.470); t (402) = +1.944, 
p=0.053.  
H3b: On average, respondents will accept the outcomes justified by sharia law and decided 
by a local religious court.  
Hypothesis is rejected at p<0.10 level. There is a significant difference between control group 
(M=0.84, SD=0.367) and treatment group (M=0.77, SD=0.420); t (426) = +1.789, p= 0.074.  
H3c: On average, respondents will believe that local religious imams are more capable of 
enforcing the outcomes than international actors (i.e., the United Nations).  
Hypothesis is rejected. There is a significant difference between control group (M=0.39, 
SD=0.489) and treatment group (M=0.23, SD=0.420); t (398) = +3.538, p=0.000.   
Table2:  
 
Results of the experiment. 










Results pooled across stable and unstable countries: 
Scenario 1:  
H1a:   The outcome justified by Sharia Law 
will bring peace. (procedural 
legitimacy) 
Marginally Supported, p= 0.063/ t=-1.867 
H1b:  Procedural legitimacy (the outcome is 
more accepted when brought through 
the Sharia procedure). 
Not Supported P=0.318 
H1c:  Ability to Enforce (Local religious 
imams are more credible to enforce) 
Rejected, p=0.006/ t= +2.776 
H1d:  Legitimacy (local religious imams are 
the proper institution). 
Rejected, p=0.029/ t= +2.186 
Scenario 2:   
H2a:  The outcome justified by Sharia Law 
will bring peace. (procedural 
legitimacy) 
Rejected, p=0.000/ t=+4.059 
H2b:  Procedural legitimacy (the outcome is 
more accepted when brought through 
the Sharia procedure). 
Supported, p= 0.038/ t=-2.086 
H2c:  Ability to Enforce (Local religious 
imams are more credible to enforce) 
Not Supported, p= 0.339.  
Scenario 3:   
H3a:  The outcome justified by Sharia Law 
will bring peace. (procedural 
legitimacy) 
Rejected, p=0.053/ t=+1.944 
H3b:  Procedural legitimacy (the outcome is 
more accepted when brought through 
the Sharia procedure). 
Rejected, p=0.074/ t=+1.789 
H3c:  Ability to Enforce (Local religious 
imams are more credible to enforce) 
Rejected, p=0.000/ t=+3.538 
Hypotheses Results 
Scenario 1: Unstable 
Countries (Libya 







6. Discussion and Conclusion  
This thesis aimed at addressing the effect of using local religious language and terms, 
implemented by local religious leaders, on the levels of acceptance of TJ pillars in post Arab 
Spring countries. This use of local language and implementation is posited as a possible solution 
for some of the problems with TJ that have caused its failure in most post-Arab Spring countries. 
The thesis identified two main problems of TJ theory that might be negatively affecting its 
implementation in the Middle East. These are the liberal paradigm and the top-down, state-
centric characteristic of TJ. To overcome these problems, transformative justice theory was 
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introduced as a bottom-up and victim-oriented process, which takes into consideration the local 
culture, religion, traditions and rituals of each country, and makes use of them to achieve a 
successful TJ process. 
 In the Middle East, Islam plays a major role in all aspects of people’s lives. There are 
strong arguments in the literature that Islam includes many justice concepts that correspond to 
international transitional justice pillars, especially in terms of restorative and retributive justice. 
Based on this, some arguments suggest that Islamic terms and processes should be considered 
when applying TJ, as they have more local legitimacy and credibility. Moreover, scholars on 
localization of TJ argue that allowing local trustworthy actors to apply traditional justice and 
reconciliation rituals will contribute to more success of the TJ process, than would foreign actors 
applying foreign terms.  
However, these arguments are mainly based on qualitative studies. Therefore, this thesis 
quantitatively studies the possible effect of changing international language and actors to local 
religious language and implementers on public acceptance of TJ pillars in post-Arab Spring 
countries. To reiterate, this thesis does not aim to study the effect of implementing Islamic 
measures which lead to different outcomes than those achieved through TJ pillars.  
The results of the research design, which included a public opinion poll survey, provided 
the following answers to the main research question and the three sub-questions:  
Main question: Can local culture and religious language promote more acceptance of 
transitional justice outcomes in post-Arab Spring countries than using foreign/international terms 
and concepts of transitional justice?  
Some evidence was found in two out of three scenarios that support this hypothesis. Respondents 
in two out of three scenarios showed a preference for outcomes justified by religious 
language/terms and Quran verse than those justified by international terms and conventions. The 
results also show that this depends on the type of TJ process addressed in each scenario.   
Sub-question 1: Do local religious actors have more legitimacy than international actors to 




The opposite seems to be true, according to the survey results. In all questions concerning the 
ability of local religious imams to enforce decisions, and whether they are the proper actors to 
decide as compared to international actors (the UN), respondents view the UN as more capable 
of enforcing the decision in all scenarios, except scenario 2, which had inconclusive results. The 
UN was also viewed as the proper institution to decide in scenario 1.  
Sub-question 2: Does religion have more legitimacy than international laws and standards in 
post-Arab Spring countries?  
There is some evidence among the results that support that religion has more procedural 
legitimacy than international laws in two out of three scenarios. However, again, it seems that it 
depends on the type of TJ process introduced. As in scenario 1 (reparation) and scenario 2 
(reconciliation) some support for decisions justified by sharia law was demonstrated, but not in 
scenario 3 (criminal justice).  
Sub-question 3: Does religion have more impact in unstable states than stable ones?  
It does not seem that religion has any special effect on unstable states when compared to a stable 
one.  
A more detailed explanation and discussion of these answers is warranted. First, in 
scenarios concerning justice to victims (reparation) and reconciliation (pardon) respondents show 
more acceptance of the outcomes that have been justified by Sharia terms rather than 
international terms. Only in the third scenario, which concerns criminal justice (justice to the 
nation), respondents showed more preference towards the UN/international law scenario rather 
than rijal al-islah/sharia law scenario. There may be some avenues of explanation for these 
results in Bolocan’s (2004), Villa-Vicencio (2009) and Kochanski’s (2020) literature on 
localizing TJ.  
In his article, Bolocan argued that local religious rituals work better than foreign 
standards in convincing people to accept reparation, reconciliation and pardon measures. This is 
because these local rituals are familiar to the public and are practiced by them in similar 
situations on familial or tribal levels. Moreover, local rituals have a higher capacity to 




parties based on these views and ideas when it comes to achieving reconciliation and reparation. 
Conversely, international foreign standards are usually viewed as “externalized” and do not fill 
the gaps that satisfy people’s minds and souls.  
In fact, in most countries (except the Gacaca courts in Rwanda) where successful local TJ 
processes were conducted, the main processes implemented have related to reconciliation, such 
as the truth and reconciliation commission in South Africa, and “cleansing and purification 
ceremonies in Angola, Mozambique, Peru, [and] Sierra Leone” to forgive and reintegrate child 
soldiers (Kochanski, 2020: 35).  
However, in our study, in the case of criminal justice and accountability of highly ranked 
state perpetrators, respondents were more affected by international standards than local 
standards. This may be because it is unusual for local religious terms to address such high level 
cases that concern the nation as a whole. According to Villa-Vicencio (2009) a survey conducted 
in Northern Uganda showed that while most respondents agree that reconciliation should be 
implemented through traditional mechanisms, no similar agreement was found for accountability 
measures being implemented through local traditional mechanisms (Villa-Vicencio, 2009).  
It is worth mentioning that responses to the follow-up questions showed strong support 
and acceptance of sharia law among respondents, compared to international law: 72.4% of 
respondents agreed that their country’s laws should be made compatible with sharia provisions, 
while only 44.8% agreed that their country’s laws should be made compatible with international 
laws. These percentages also support the two positive findings of sharia language’s effect in 
cases of reparation and reconciliation. This calls for further research with more scenarios and a 
higher sample size in order to see if similar results are found, that allowing us to consider 
generalizability. 
When comparing results of unstable (conflicting) versus stable countries, no evidence 
could be found that respondents in unstable countries are more positively affected by the 
outcomes supported by religious terms rather than international terms.  Thus, Platteau’s (2007) 
and Inglehart’s et al. (2006) arguments that people in unstable states tend toward their local 




On the other hand, respondents in unstable countries did not view local religious imams 
as more capable of enforcing decisions than the UN. On the contrary, the UN was seen as more 
capable to enforce its decisions. Similar results presented in only one question in Jordan. Again, 
this could be due to the small sample size (149 respondents from Jordan) as it did not allow us to 
capture significant differences among the control and treatment groups in any of the remaining 
questions on enforcement.    
Secondly, when not divided by country (sample size 435 respondents), we find complete 
support for the UN as a more capable actor to enforce its decisions than local religious ones, in 
all scenarios. This finding should be considered in any further research aiming to study the 
possible effect of localization of TJ in post Arab Spring countries. The strong presence and 
influence of local religious leaders in achieving informal justice inside the communities, as was 
particularly indicated in the literature regarding Yemen and Libya, does not necessarily mean 
that these actors are the most desired during TJ. In fact, a 2019 survey by Arab barometer 
conducted in Libya, Jordan, Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia and Iraq captured that people in Middle 
Eastern countries are losing their trust in local religious leaders. While 51% respondents trusted 
them in 2015, this percentage dropped to 40% in 2019. This recent drop in trust explains the 
absence of this issue from the literature which calls on allowing local religious actors to 
implement religious justice measures in Arab countries.  
What is interesting to consider is that, despite this acceptance of UN actors as enforcers, 
the survey found higher trust in local religious imams and higher satisfaction with the results rijal 
al-islah achieved regarding personal/local issues (see figures 11 and 12 in Appendix B). One 
explanation for this contradiction is that, although people trust their local imams with solving 
family or land issues within their area or tribe, they do not believe that those actors are strong 
enough to enforce broader societal decisions on different levels. Kochanski (2020) has argued 
that it is not necessary that local religious leaders, who are viewed as legitimate to solve smaller 
local issues, should also be seen as the proper actors in big transitional justice issues. Kochanski 
argued that changing political interests and changing levels of trust among the different segments 
of the society during civil conflict periods make it difficult for all parts of society to agree on a 
certain local or traditional actor. However, it appears that further research on this contradiction in 




Finally, there has been some evidence that respondents in the second scenario were in fact more 
convinced by the direct verse of Quran (Muslim holy book) than by the provision from Geneva 
Convention 2nd Protocol. Quran is considered to be the speech of God and maintains high respect 
and acceptance among most Muslims (BBC, 2011). Therefore, according to Platteau’s research 
(2007), leaders of Muslim countries in situations of peace or war are using religious rhetoric, 
including Quran verses, in order to gain more credibility and support for their decisions. This 
could be an explanation of our finding. However, as it is only one scenario which contained the 
Quran verse, it is not possible to generalize a conclusion on its effect. This is a limitation in this 
study, and due to the difficulty of matching Quran verses with legal articles, as the present author 
is not an expert in any of either. Therefore, further research with a greater variety of scenarios 
could be helpful in capturing whether this explanatory hypothesis could be supported. 
To recapitulate, the main finding of this study is that people in Middle Eastern countries still 
believe that the UN is more capable of enforcing decisions when it comes to TJ pillars. This is 
despite the high mistrust in them and anti-Western sentiment. Although there is a high preference 
for Sharia law, people are afraid that local religious implementers do not have the capabilities 
needed to enforce TJ decisions.  
The study has also found some evidence that local religious terms and concepts are more capable 
of convincing people to accept the outcomes of TJ in issues of reparation and reconciliation than 
are international ones. This may be because these issues are closer to victims and do not aim to 
achieve criminal justice or prosecution of high-ranking perpetrators, on which the UN and 
international law language seem to be more realistic.  
In conclusion, this thesis suggests an important recommendation for the United Nations when 
implementing transitional justice pillars in post Arab Spring countries: to consider local religious 
language and terms when addressing victims for reparation and reconciliation, in order to gain 
more procedural legitimacy. In addition, this thesis concludes that the UN is still an important 
actor in achieving transitional justice in post-Arab Spring countries, which should not be ignored 
or viewed as too Western when studying localization of TJ in Arab states. Rather, more research 
should be conducted on the possibilities of cooperation between the UN and local religious 




Declaration of “Faiths for Rights” (2017) could be considered as a good starting point toward 
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8.1. Appendix A (The Survey in English)  
Thank you for accepting to cooperate with us to complete this short questionnaire, which is part 
of a master’s thesis for the Department of Political Science at Gothenburg University, Sweden. 
In this questionnaire we will show you some hypothetical scenarios that occurred in a country 
that was suffering from a civil war. There are attempts now to achieve justice for the victims of 
that war in order to achieve peace. Your participation is completely voluntary, and you can opt 
out of answering the question or the entire survey at any time.   
 
The questionnaire is about 8 minutes long 
 
All information in this questionnaire is confidential and your answers will be used for statistical 
and research purposes only. 
 
The questionnaire is subject to the general European data protection system. 
 
Q1. If you accept to participate according to the above conditions, click Accept to go to the 
questionnaire:  
 
1. I accept to participate in this survey 
2. I do not accept (This will end the survey) 
………………………….  
Welcome, First, I would like to get know a little about you…  
 
Q2. What is your age group? 
1. 18-35 
2.  36-55 
3. 56 and above 
4. Under 18 years old (end of survey) 
 
Q3. What is your gender? 
1. Male 




3.  Prefer not to answer 
Q4. What is your educational level? 
1. Basic education (1st - 9th grade) 
2. High School 
3.  Bachelor's degree or diploma 
4. Master and above 
5.  Other  




…………………    
I will now show you a number of hypothetical scenarios that have occurred in an Arab, Muslim 
majority country which has been suffering from civil war following the overthrow of a previous 
regime. There are currently efforts to achieve justice for the victims in order to achieve peace in 
this country. I would like you to imagine that you are a citizen of this country. Do you support 
the outcomes described below?  
Before we start, allow me to introduce to you some definitions that might appear in the 
scenarios:  
A. International law is: A set of rules, norms, and standards generally accepted by the 
nations and regulate different aspects of life. Its main sources are international 
conventions and treaties.  
B. Sharia law: A set of rules, norms and standards regulating different aspects of life. It is 
derived mainly from the holy Quran and the hadith.   
Scenario 1: Concerning specific victims, closer to victims and justice for them, local community.  
 Q6. During the conflict, a family’s home was bombed. Their house was completely destroyed 
and 3 of them ended up with disabilities. In an attempt to gain justice for this family and to 
achieve peace in the community more broadly, (the United Nations/ rijal Al-Islah) consisting of 




(International law/ Sharia law). The (compensation/Dya) shall include the value of treatment, 
compensation for the damage, and the value of the bombed house and furniture.  
(Matrix Table) 
 Q6.1: Do you believe that the outcome of this scenario will help to bring about peace to the 
community?  
Q6.2: Do you agree with the decision in this scenario?  
Q6.3: Could the United Nations/Rijal Al-Islah enforce this decision?  




99.DK   
Scenario 2: Reconciliation and forgiveness of perpetrators involved in civil conflict.  
Q7. During the conflict, the (United Nations/ men of reconciliation (rijal Al-Islah) consisting of 
local religious imams) seek to achieve (peace/sulh) between those who were involved, however 
as this was a civil war, there are too many perpetrators to put them all on trial or punish them all. 
Therefore, (The UN/Imams) have offered a pardon based on values of (international law/ Sulh 
according to the Sharia) for subordinate soldiers of all parties who were involved in lesser 
violations. The (UN/ Rijal Al-Islah) based this decision on the principles set forth in (the 
internationally ratified Geneva Conventions, the Quran).   
Prosecution will be limited to the most highly ranked leaders only.  
- Article 6 of Protocol 2: “At the end of hostilities, the authorities in power shall endeavor to 
grant the broadest possible amnesty to persons who have participated in the armed conflict.”  
  - Verse 40 of Surah Ash-Shurah in the Quran: “whoever pardons and makes reconciliation, his 




If you were one of the civilians who were affected by the conflict, how much do you agree with 
the following? (Matrix table): 
Q7.1: Do you believe that the outcome will help to bring about peace to the community?  
Q7.2: Do you agree with the idea of pardon that was introduced in this scenario? 




Scenario 3: Justice for the nation as a whole.  Wronged the nation, representative for the country.  
Q8. After the end of the conflict, the Minister of the Economy was arrested for corruption related 
to the confiscation of the property of opposition party members and discrimination against them. 
He was tried in (an international special tribunal created by the United Nations13 / a local court 
created by rijal Al-Islah consisting of local religious imams14). According to the tenets of 
(international laws15/ Shari’a laws16) the (UN/local religious) court sentenced the minister to 
return all of the confiscated money in addition to a (fine/ taizier) to be equivalent to the value of 
harm to the community and the affected groups. He was also sentenced to 5 years in jail for 
discrimination.  
Taizier: A penalty based on the court’s discretion. It is decided on people who commit crimes 
that do not have a specific provision in the Sharia.  
(Matrix Table) 
Q8.1: Do you believe that the outcome will help to bring about peace to the community.  
 
13 According to https://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/publications/robbery_humanity.pdf, certain economic crimes 
which are related to violation of fundamental human rights such as discrimination against certain group can be 
treated as crimes against humanity thus enters the jurisdiction of international tribunals or ICC.  
14Gacaca Courts in Rwanda are one example that inspired me. 
15 The decision inspired from “Prosecuting Financial Crime: Guidelines for Judges and Prosecutors” UNDP.org.  
16 The decision is based on Islamic rules of bringing officials accountable, Dya rules, and Ta’azer rules. The judge 




Q8.2: Do you agree with the decision of the (UN/local religious) court? 
Q8.3: Do you think that the (UN/local religious) court has the ability to enforce this decision?  
1.Yes 
0. No   
99.Don’t Know. 
Final Questions:   
 (All your answers are anonymous and will be used only for research and statistical reasons).  
Q9. Have you ever travelled to Europe or the USA?  
1. Yes, for a week or two.  
2. Yes, for a month or two.  
3. Yes, for less than a year.  
4. Yes, for more than a year.  
5. No, I’ve never travelled to Europe or USA.  
6. I don’t want to answer.  
Q10. What is your religion?  
1. Muslim      
       2. Christian  
      3.   Jew   
       4.  Other  
      5.   Prefer not to answer.  
Q11. Do you pray Daily?  
1. Always  
2. Most of the Time  
3. Some of the Time  
4. Rarely  





Q12. How much trust do you have in the following institutions? (a scale of 1-5, 1 star=do not 
trust/ 5 stars=highly trust)  
Q12_1. The United Nations 
Q12_2. Rijal Al-Islah of local religious men and imams  
Q12_3. The courts and legal system of your country 
 
Q13. What do you think of the following sentences? (Matrix Table) 
Q13_1. The government in your country should make laws compatible with Sharia Laws.  
Q13_.2. The government in your country should make laws compatible with the international 
laws.  
Q13_3. Interference from other Arab and Islamic countries is an obstacle to reform in your 
country.  
Q13_4. The government in your country should implement Sharia laws in some areas and civil 
(local) laws in other areas.  
Q13_5 Interference from the west is an obstacle to reform in your country   
1. Totally Agree  
2. Agree to some extent  
3. Disagree  
4. Neutral  
5. Don’t Know 
Q14. (0,1,2,3,4,517): Have you ever interacted with the United Nations or any international 
organization?  (several answers could be selected) 
0. No, I have never interacted with UN/international law 
1. Yes, I received aid from the UN/international organization  
2. Yes, I sent an individual complaint to the UN 
3. Yes, I work with the UN/International organization 
4. Yes, I studied about UN and/or international law. 
5. Prefer not to answer.   
Q15. Were you satisfied with their work? (if Yes is chosen in Q14) 
 




0. No  
1. Yes  
2. Prefer not to answer. 
Q16. Why not? (if No is chosen in Q14) 
1. I didn’t face a problem that needs their intervention  
2. It is hard to reach them 
3. I do not trust the UN 
4. I don’t know to whom I can turn.  
Q17. Have you ever turned to an Imam or Muslim religious man (rijal Al-Islah) for help in any 
issue you had?  
0. No  
1. Yes  
2. Prefer not to answer  
Q18. Were you satisfied with the results? (if yes is chosen for Q16)   
0.  No 
1.  Yes  
2. Prefer not to answer 
Q19. Why Not? (if No is chosen for Q16) 
1. I don’t Trust them 
2. I didn’t have a problem that needs their intervention  
3. It is hard to reach 
4. I don’t know to whom I can turn.  











8.2. Appendix B (Descriptive Statistics) 
1. Demographic Figures:  
A. Gender:  
 









D. Where are you from?  
 
2. Block 3 answers illustrative figures and tables:   
Table 1:  
Religiosity Level:  
 




Always 305 70.1 
most of the time 54 12.4 
Sometimes 25 5.7 
Rarely 19 4.4 
prefer not to 
answer 
32 7.4 















Table 2:  
Interaction with Local Religious Imams:  
 
 Have you ever turned to an Imam or Muslim religious man (rijal Al-
Islah) for help in any issue you had? 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Answer: No 296 68.0 68.0 68.0 
Yes 115 26.4 26.4 94.5 
Prefer not to 
answer 
24 5.5 5.5 100.0 







Table 3:  
Interaction with the UN or International Law (IL): 
 
 
Have you ever 
interacted with the UN 
or IL? 
N Percent 




Yes, I sent an individual 
complaint to the UN 
16 3.7% 




Yes, I studied about UN 
and/or international law. 
89 20.5% 
Never dealt with UN or IL 255 58.6% 













Table 4:  
How much do you think that interference from Arab and Muslim countries is an obstacle to 




 Country Total 
Libya Yemen Jordan 
Interference 
from other Arab 
and Muslim 
countries is an 
obstacle to 




Count 121 87 43 251 
% between 
countries 






72.5% 73.1% 28.9% 57.7% 
% of Total 27.8% 20.0% 9.9% 57.7% 
Agree to 
some extent 
Count 26 23 57 106 
% between 
countries 
24.5% 21.7% 53.8% 100.0
% 




15.6% 19.3% 38.3% 24.4% 
% of Total 6.0% 5.3% 13.1% 24.4% 
Disagree Count 11 4 17 32 
% between 
countries  
34.4% 12.5% 53.1% 100.0
% 




6.6% 3.4% 11.4% 7.4% 
% of Total 2.5% 0.9% 3.9% 7.4% 
Neutral Count 2 1 14 17 
% between 
countries  
11.8% 5.9% 82.4% 100.0
% 
% within level 
of agreement 






% of Total 0.5% 0.2% 3.2% 3.9% 
DK Count 7 4 18 29 
% between 
countries  
24.1% 13.8% 62.1% 100.0
% 




4.2% 3.4% 12.1% 6.7% 
% of Total 1.6% 0.9% 4.1% 6.7% 
Total Count 167 119 149 435 
% between 
countries 
38.4% 27.4% 34.3% 100.0
% 















 Value df Asymptotic 
Significance 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 84.583a 8 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 86.568 8 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
43.765 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 435   
a. 1 cells (6.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum 






Table 5:  
How much do you think that western interference is an obstacle to Reform in your country? 
(Comparison among countries) 
 
Crosstab 





the west within is an 
obstacle to reform 
in your country 
Strongly agree Count 118 75 89 282 
% between 
countries 
41.8% 26.6% 31.6% 100.0
% 
% within the 
country 
70.7% 63.0% 59.7% 64.8
% 
% of Total 27.1% 17.2% 20.5% 64.8
% 
Agree to some 
extent 
Count 28 28 38 94 
% between 
countries 
29.8% 29.8% 40.4% 100.0
% 
% within the 
country 
16.8% 23.5% 25.5% 21.6
% 
% of Total 6.4% 6.4% 8.7% 21.6
% 
Disagree Count 7 5 5 17 
% between 
countries 
41.2% 29.4% 29.4% 100.0
% 
% within the 
country 
4.2% 4.2% 3.4% 3.9% 
% of Total 1.6% 1.1% 1.1% 3.9% 
Neutral Count 10 8 7 25 
% between 
countries 
40.0% 32.0% 28.0% 100.0
% 
% within the 
country 
6.0% 6.7% 4.7% 5.7% 
% of Total 2.3% 1.8% 1.6% 5.7% 
Don't know Count 4 3 10 17 
% between 
countries 





% within the 
country 
2.4% 2.5% 6.7% 3.9% 
% of Total 0.9% 0.7% 2.3% 3.9% 
Total Count 167 119 149 435 
% between 
countries 
38.4% 27.4% 34.3% 100.0
% 












 Value df Asymptotic 
Significance 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 9.830a 8 .277 
Likelihood Ratio 9.633 8 .292 
Linear-by-Linear 
sQAssociation 
2.915 1 .088 
N of Valid Cases 435   
a. 2 cells (13.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum 









8.3. Appendix C (Results of the Experiment) 
1. General Results  
Table 6:  





F Sig. T df Sig. (2-
tailed) 
t-test for Equality of 
Means.  
95% Confidence 












0.281 0.596 -1.867 412 0.063 -0.092 0.049 -0.188 0.005 
H1b: 
 
3.903 0.049 -1.001 413 0.318 -0.047 0.047 -0.140 0.046 
H1c: 
 
31.903 0.000 2.776 393 0.006 0.114 0.041 0.033 0.195 
H1d:  
 
17.324 0.000 2.186 390 0.029 0.106 0.048 0.011 0.201 
H2a: 
 
75.945 0.000 4.059 406 0.000 0.164 0.040 0.084 0.243 
H2b: 
 
16.189 0.000 -2.086 421 0.038 -0.099 0.048 -0.193 -0.006 
H2c:  
 
3.678 0.056 -0.958 407 0.339 -0.047 0.049 -0.142 0.049 
H3a: 
  
15.253 0.000 1.944 402 0.053 0.067 0.045 -0.001 0.175 
H3b:  
 
13.045 0.000 1.789 426 0.074 0.068 0.035 -0.007 0.143 
H3c:  
 
47.205 0.000 3.538 398 0.000 0.161 0.046 0.072 0.251 
 
Table 7:  


























1.004 1 0.318 -0.047 
H1c 
 
7.596 1 0.006 0.144 
H1d 
 
4.743 1 0.029 0.106 
H2a 
 
16.123 1 0.000 0.163 
H2b 
 
4.627 1 0.031 -0.102 
H2c 
 
0.0677 1 0.410 -0.040 
H3a 
 
3.762 1 0.052 0.087 
H3b 
 
3.199 1 0.074 0.008 
H3c 
 
12.197 1 0.000 0.161 
 
2. Across stable (Jordan) and unstable countries (Libya and Yemen together) Results:   
Table 8:  






f Sig. t df Sig. (2-
tailed) 
t-test for Equality of 
Means.  
95% Confidence 














0.309 -0.885 271 0.377 -0.054 0.061 -0.173 0.066 
H1b: 
 
1.498 0.222 -0.619 276 0.537 -0.03560 0.05755 -0.14888 0.07769 
H1c: 
 
52.408 0.000 3.459 252 0.001 0.1682 0.04663 0.07244 0.26398 
H1d:  
 
3.837 0.051 0.989 259 0.324 0.05659 0.05724 -0.05612 0.16930 
H2a: 
 
65.253 0.000 3.656 271 0.000 0.18105 0.04952 0.08356 0.27855 
H2b: 
 
12.861 0.000 -1.783 276 0.076 -0.10417 0.05841 -0.21917 0.01083 
H2c:  
 






15.240 0.000 1.950 258 0.052 0.10964 0.05623 -0.00109 0.22038 
H3b:  
 
9.265 0.003 1.510 280 0.132 0.07958 0.04958 -0.02276 0.17245 
H3c:  
 
53.992 0.000 3.682 266 0.000 0.19532 0.05305 0.09088 0.29976 
 
Table 9:  







F Sig. T df Sig. (2-
tailed) 
t-test for Equality of 
Means.  
95% Confidence 












3.282 0.072 -1.684 137 0.094 -0.142 0.084 -0.309 0.025 
H1b: 
 
1.617 0.206 -0.639 135 0.524 -0.05384 0.08426 -0.2204 0.11280 
H1c: 
 
8.220 0.005 -1.489 136 0.139 -2.99369 2.01065 -6.9698 0.9825 
H1d:  
 
2.499 0.116 2.274 129 0.025 0.19671 0.08051 0.02554 0.3678 
H2a: 
 
14.492 0.000 1.851 133 0.066 0.13016 0.07033 -0.0894 0.26926 
H2b: 
 
3.697 0.057 -1.262 143 0.209 -0.10426 0.08259 -0.26752 0.05899 
H2c:  
 
0.000 1.000 0.000 136 1.000 0.0000 0.08387 -0.16583 0.16583 
H3a: 
  
1.602 0.208 0.630 142 0.530 0.04696 0.07455 -0.10041 0.19432 
H3b:  
 
3.755 0.055 0.959 144 0.339 0.05479 0.05712 -0.05811 0.16770 
H3c:  
 
3.500 0.064 0.972 130 0.333 0.08272 0.08514 -0.08572 0.25116 
 
Table 10:  


















1 0.375 0.054 
H1b 
 
0.385 1 0.535 0.036 
H1c 
 
11.514 1 0.001 0.168 
H1d 
 
0.981 1 0.322 -0.056 
H2a 
 
12.833 1 0.000 0.178 
H2b 
 
3.167 1 0.075 -0.102 
H2c 
 
1.108 1 0.293 -0.062 
H3a 
 
3.775 1 0.052 0.110 
H3b 
 
2.276 1 0.131 -0.075 
H3c 12.997 1 0.000 0.195 
Table 10:  


















1 0.093 -0.141 
H1b 
 
0.413 1 0.520 0.053 
H1c 
 
2.214 1 0.330 0.032 
H1d 
 
5.048 1 0.025 0.195 
H2a 
 
3.390 1 0.066 0.130 
H2b 
 
1.598 1 0.206 0.104 
H2c 
 
0.000 1 1.000 0.000 
H3a 
 
0.401 1 0.526 -0.047 
H3b 
 
0.927 1 0.336 -0.055 
H3c 
 
0.952 1 0.329 -0.083 
83 
 
  
 
